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 Beyond doubt, vaccines are one of the biggest global health achievements. According to 
the World Health Organisation (WHO), vaccination helps prevent an estimated two to three million 
deaths per annum (Bustreo, 2016). In recent years, however, governments worldwide have been 
forced to take action against the steady return of previously eradicated or controlled diseases, such 
as measles and rubella. In Europe, more than 116000 cases of measles have been reported in 2019 
alone (WHO, 2020). The problem is not restricted to the developing European economies, and it 
affects countries such as Germany and the United Kingdom. In Germany, almost 9000 cases of 
measles have been registered for the past 8 years (WHO, 2020), while the cases in the UK approach 
8000 for the same period. To counter the issue, the German parliament approved the "Measles 
Protection Law" (Masernschutzgesetz), which states that as of March 2020 children and staff in 
communal facilities must be vaccinated. Failure to comply will result in fining parents and banning 
their children from schools and kindergartens. In the UK, however, similar approaches are deemed 
too restrictive. Leading health experts are concerned with the effectiveness of mandatory 
vaccination, and point out the negative long term outcomes of excluding children from school 
(Bedford, 2020). As a cheaper and less paternalistic alternative, academics proposed using default 
rules in policies aimed at promoting vaccination (Guibilini et al., 2019; Brewer et al., 2017). A 
default rule goes into effect unless the decision-makers specify otherwise (Brown & Krishna, 
2004), and setting such rules has been a major success in increasing vaccination rates (Chapman, 
Li, Colby, & Yoon, 2010) and decreasing vaccine refusals (Opel & Omer, 2015).  
 Despite its effectiveness, the use of default options was met with considerable criticism on 






the targeted population has little awareness of the impact defaults have on their decisions (Hansen 
& Jespersen, 2013), which can be interpreted as a threat to their autonomy. At the same time, 
transparency has been discussed as possibly reducing the effectiveness of policy interventions in 
general, including defaulting (Bovens, 2009). Supposedly, once the targeted individuals realise 
their choices have been influenced, they can retaliate and opt-out, due to manifestations of 
psychological reactance (Brehm, 1966; Brehm & Brehm, 1981), or general willingness to preserve 
their autonomy (Ryan & Deci, 2000). 
 Naturally, policy makers would want the best of both worlds: a behavioural intervention, 
which reliably increases policy compliance, and does so in an ethical way. Is that at all possible, 
however? The following dissertation aims to answer this question, and to demonstrate that 
transparency can even boost the effectiveness of default nudges. Further, I highlight the discrete 
forms of transparency which can benefit default compliance. Last, I demonstrate that combining 

















This cumulative dissertation is based on the following three empirical papers: 
1. Paunov, Y., Wänke, M., & Vogel, T. (2019a). Transparency effects on policy 
 compliance: disclosing how defaults work can enhance their effectiveness. 
 Behavioural Public Policy, 3(2), 187-208. https://doi.org/10.1017/bpp.2018.40 
  
2. Paunov, Y., Wänke, M., & Vogel, T. (2019b). Ethical defaults: which transparency 
 components can increase the effectiveness of default nudges?. Social Influence, 
 14(3-4), 104-116. https://doi.org/10.1080/15534510.2019.1675755 
 
3. Paunov, Y., Wänke, M., & Vogel, T. (in press). Combining defaults and transparency 
 information to increase policy compliance. Social Psychology. 
The papers are presented in Appendix I in their manuscript form.  
The dissertation body is organized into three sections – a theoretical frame section, an 
empirical summary section, and a general discussion section. The first section contains the 
synthesis and analysis of the literature, relevant for the dissertation project. There, the essential 
theoretical concepts such as nudging, defaulting, and transparency are introduced, followed by a 
summary and discussion of the current literature on transparent defaulting. After that, the research 
questions, which represent the core of the dissertation, are formalized. The empirical summary 
section follows, aiming to answer these questions by presenting evidence from the experimental 
studies included in the dissertation project. Last, the general discussion section derives the 












 One of the corner stones of democracy is the shared belief that the very purpose of political 
organization is to ensure the well-being of society’s members. This purpose is achieved through 
provision and maintenance of the greater good, defined as an amalgamation of common social 
interests and facilities (Rawls, 1971). While interpretations of the construct differ (Hussain, 2018), 
there is a universal agreement that policy-makers and citizens alike are expected to act in a way, 
which promotes it. The citizens dedicate a stake of their freedom and resources to elected 
representatives, which in turn use their power to materialize and preserve the greater good via 
instituting various laws and policies. 
 Traditionally, compliance to such policies is assured through campaigning, incentivisation, 
and, in some cases, penalization for non-compliance. Often, however, these approaches are either 
expensive (Capraro et al., 2018), or too paternalistic and restrictive (Thaler & Sunstein, 2008). As 
an alternative, Thaler & Sunstein (2008) proposed an innovative approach avoiding steep costs and 
strict regulations. Integrating insights from social psychology and dual-process theories (Evans, 
1984, Chaiken & Trope, 1999), the authors introduced a set of behavioral interventions aimed at 
promoting various prosocial and self-beneficial behaviors. These interventions, or “nudges”, make 
use of subtle changes in the decision environment in order to guide people’s actions. While a 
precise operational definition of nudging is still missing, (Marteau, Ogilvie, Roland, Suhrcke, & 
Kelly, 2011) ten years of implementation have cemented the nudging approach as the social 







 At its core, nudging reflects a rather appealing governance approach, which Thaler and 
Sunstein (2008) label “libertarian paternalism”. Its libertarian aspect is related to the claim, that 
nudging policies do not forbid or penalize non-compliant behavior. Instead, they aim to influence 
the way choices are presented to the targeted population, an approach branded as “choice 
architecture”. Nudging is also paternalistic to the extent that it ascribes legitimacy to the actions of 
certain influence agents, or “choice architects”, in their intent to influence people’s behavior. In 
this sense, nudges are described as both liberty-preserving and paternalistic, representing a sort of 
“soft” and “self-conscious” (Thaler & Sunsten, 2008) effort on behalf of governments and private 
parties to guide people’s choices for their own good.  
 While such philosophy can be rather questionable under close scrutiny1, there is little doubt 
that most nudges appeal to the general public. As Jung and Mellers (2016) demonstrated, 
Americans consider them necessary and effective, and express general support for a variety of 
nudge-based policies. Data from most European countries reveal a similar pattern (Reisch, 
Sunstein, & Gwozdz, 2017). A few examples of successful nudges: when a number of UK 
municipalities decided to paint green footsteps leading to their communal trash bins, they measured 
a staggering reduction in littering of 19.5% (KBT Report, 2015). In the US, re-arranging food items 
in school cafeterias made healthy food choices easier to access, and increased sales of healthier 
food by 18% while simultaneously decreased unhealthy food consumption by 28% (Hanks, Just, 
& Wansink, 2012). Implementing intentions by proactively choosing a date and time for an 
influenza shot increased vaccination rates in a number of US companies with 4.2% (Milkman, 
 
1 In the sense that it potentially legitimizes policy interventions from private agents, which may not have people’s 
best interests in mind. In contrast, governmental institutions receive explicit mandate to implement policies in order 







Beshears, Choi, Laibson, & Madrian, 2011). In short, the examples of successful nudges are as 
numerous as the problems they address. The next section presents the most effective nudging 
approach: the use of default options. 
 
Defaults 
 No other nudge has received as much scientific and public attention as defaulting. A default 
is “the choice alternative a consumer receives if he/she does not explicitly specify otherwise” 
(Brown & Krishna, 2004, p.529). In the general case, default nudges are characterized by a decision 
situation in which one of the choice options is pre-selected, but the decision-maker retains the 
possibility to actively choose another alternative (i.e., to opt out). A large body of research (for 
reviews see Willis, 2013, and Szaszi et al., 2018) demonstrates that people exhibit clear preferences 
for the default option, thus making defaulting the most effective nudging strategy (Hummel & 
Maedche, 2019). Defaults have particularly strong impact in cases when the decision-makers 
perceive the default option as the recommended one (McKenzie, Liersch, & Finkelstein, 2006), or 
when the pre-selected behavior is altruistic (Everett et al., 2014). Default effects are powerful2, and 
default interventions have been successfully implemented by private and governmental institutions 
as means of increasing policy compliance. Perhaps the most clear-cut demonstration of how 
effective those interventions are is reported by Johnson and Goldstein (2003). The authors present 
data from a number of European countries, which differ in their organ donation policies. If German 
or Dutch citizens want to be organ donors, they have to proactively register and carry an organ 
donor pass with them at all times. However, in countries like Austria and Hungary donation consent 
 
2 Hummel & Maedche (2019) report a relative effect size of 78% for default nudges. Data were extracted from 21 
studies and 62 separate effects. The authors define relative effect size as the percentage change between the 






is automatically presumed, while one retains the freedom to opt-out by filling in a specific legal 
form. With a simple flip of the status quo, courtiers with opt-out donation policies boasted a 
staggering 99% average compliance (Johnson & Goldstein, 2003). 
 Defaulting is also effective when it comes to environmental preservation. In several lab 
experiments and natural studies Pichert and Katsikopoulos (2008) demonstrated that people’s 
choices of electricity providers (green/from renewable energy sources vs. grey/from coal plants) 
are dependent on the option, which is presented as the default. As a result of the default 
intervention, the village of Schönau in Baden-Württemberg is now entirely powered by “green” 
energy sources since 2007. In addition, approximately 94% of all customers of a large South 
German energy provider also “switched” to renewable power once the option became the status 
quo. 
The Default Effect 
 The research interest in defaulting matches the popularity of default nudges, and the 
literature reflects several schools of thought regarding the cause of the default effect. The first 
category of explanations (labelled further “cognitive bias account”) interprets the effect as a result 
of various decision-making biases. One interpretation from this category points out to loss aversion 
(Kahneman & Tversky, 1984;1991) and the endowment effect (Kahneman, Knetsch, & Thaler, 
2011) as potential antecedents of the default effect. It has been theorized that people stick with 
defaulted options because they view them as their own, and giving them up is perceived as a loss 
(Kahneman, Knetsch, & Thaler, 1991). Another bias-based explanation is that people are more 
likely to blame themselves and experience regret about a poor outcome when they change a default, 






remain with the pre-selection, a manifestation of a phenomenon, known as the omission bias (Ritov 
& Baron, 1990). 
 A different perspective (addressed further as “communication account”) regards defaults as 
a form of social interaction between policy makers and the targeted population. As in most other 
communication settings, a communicator’s choice of message carries information about her/his 
attitudes toward a given choice option (Sher & McKenzie, 2006). In fact, McKenzie et al. (2006) 
demonstrated that when defaulted, the targeted individuals were able to recognize that the pre-
selected choice option is the preferred one, and that the experimenters wanted them to pick that 
option. Consequently, the participants exhibited a clear preference for that option. Therefore, the 
authors concluded that setting up a default per se was perceived as a form of an implicit 
recommendation, which in turn resulted in compliant behavior.  
 Overall, the abovementioned perspectives provide an insight as to why defaults are a very 
successful way of influencing choice. However, both the cognitive bias and communication 
accounts are vulnerable to criticism, which has triggered a considerable discussion about the 
implementation of default nudges. The next section introduces that discussion. 
Defaults and transparency: Ethicality debate 
The use of defaults has raised ethical concerns related to their supposedly covert nature. To 
clarify, default nudges are presumably “working in a way that the citizen in the situation cannot 
reconstruct either the intention or the means by which behavioral change is pursued” (Hansen & 
Jespersen, 2013, p. 17). This account holds true if one takes the cognitive bias account as a probable 
cause for the default effect: both the omission bias and the endowment effect are processes, over 






1990). Hence, some researchers argued that defaulting is unethical, and default-based policies 
would limit people’s autonomy and ability to exercise informed choice (Smith, Goldstein & 
Johnson, 2013).  
However, others claim that all nudges, including defaults, inherently contain a necessary 
degree of transparency in their nature (Bovens, 2009). One can assume that any given nudge 
consists of tangible environmental cues, such as the arrangement of food items in the cafeteria, or 
the green steps leading to trashcans. These cues or features realize the choice architecture, and are 
potentially recognizable by the targeted individuals. Therefore, they introduce a necessary degree 
of in principle transparency (Bovens, 2009) to the given nudge. In default interventions, this would 
mean that the targeted individuals have the theoretical ability to acknowledge the pre-selection, i.e. 
to become aware of its presence in the choice environment. In fact, if one assumes that the default 
effect is driven by implicit recommendations (McKenzie et al., 2006), it follows that people do 
recognize the influence attempt. It is this realization is enables them to make inferences about the 
default-setter’s preferences and intentions in the first place, before they can conclude that the 
default is recommended. Therefore, it does not seem prudent to consider defaults as entirely non-
transparent. 
Nevertheless, one can argue that potential transparency and implicit endorsement are 
necessary, but not sufficient conditions for the ethical justification of defaults. First, the theoretical 
possibility to acknowledge the default does not automatically translate to actual awareness. 
Whether one becomes aware would depend on a variety of situational and personal factors, such 
as her/his watchfulness (Ivancovic & Engelen, 2019), or the degree to which the pre-selection is 






the introduction of default plate sizes to control snacking and unhealthy food consumption. A 
number of field experiments (for a meta-analysis see Cadario & Chandron, 2018) demonstrate that 
setting downsized plates as the default leads to reduced calorie intake and less snacking. In such 
cases, the autonomy of those who fail to recognize the pre-selection is still diminished, since they 
remain completely unaware of the influence on their choice. 
Second, while it is true that the implicit recommendation account presupposes awareness 
of the pre-selection, the inferences people make once they become aware can vary greatly. If the 
targeted individuals infer that the default option is not only recommended, but also the best one 
(Smith, Goldstein, & Johnson, 2003), or the socially accepted one (Sunstein & Thaler, 2003), their 
autonomy can still be affected by non-deliberate mechanisms, such as normative pressure (Everett 
et al., 2014) or the imitation heuristic (Henrich et al., 2001). 
In sum, there is evidence that while defaulting is not completely non-transparent (under 
certain pre-conditions), it is also not autonomy preserving. Hence, a number of researchers called 
for an increase in transparency when nudging with defaults, especially on the governmental level 
(Sunstein, 2015; Ivancovic & Engelen, 2019).  
Defaults and transparency: Effectiveness debate 
In turn, however, the call for transparency sparked another debate about the nature of the 
relationship between transparency and the effectiveness of defaults and nudges in general. 
According to some researchers, there is a tradeoff between transparency and effectiveness when 
nudging interventions are implemented. Bovens (2009) speculated that most nudges should 
become increasingly ineffective the more people realize they are being nudged: “the more 






that Bovens considered the nudging approach transparent in principle, the common lack of de facto 
transparency in the implementation of most nudges deemed nudged decisions non-autonomous. 
Therefore, he speculated that even if people comply with a given nudge, they would engage in 
behaviors that are inconsistent with their initial decision once they become aware of the influence 
on their choice. Thus, the author concluded that nudges, such as defaults, work “better in the dark” 
and could lose their effectiveness when transparency is introduced. 
Prominent psychological theorizing seems to support such a position. In general, people 
strive for self-determination (Deci, 1975; Ryan & Deci, 2000) and resent limitations to their 
freedom of choice. In order to reinstall that freedom, they could deliberately resist choosing a 
defaulted option, and would rather endorse alternative ones, a manifestation of retaliatory behavior 
known as psychological reactance (Brehm, 1966; 1981).  
However, if one considers defaults a form of a social interaction, concerns about a tradeoff 
between transparency and effectiveness do not seem as justified. Adopting this perspective, one 
would predict that a proactive disclosure of the default strategy may not harm its effectiveness, but 
can even give it a boost. One reason would be that a disclosure can greatly simplify the decision 
situation for the targeted individuals. As discussed previously, people can comply with a default 
nudge since they recognize a pre-selected option as the recommended one. However, that is merely 
one of the conclusions they reach when defaulted, and it is unlikely to be the first one. Like most 
social interactions, the default nudge is a communication setting, in which people make a number 
of pragmatic inferences in order to make sense of the situation and satisfy their needs to convey 
meaning (Wänke, 2007). Since a direct message from the default-setter is missing, they first need 
to infer that the pre-selection is the message. Only after that, they can start making further 






disclosure of the default, however, could make the policy maker’s intent clear, and would also 
clarify which behaviour is expected from the targeted individuals. Therefore, adding accurate 
transparency information to the default setting could potentially reduce the number of pragmatic 
inferences and cognitive processing needed to reach a decision, and lessen the uncertainty in the 
decision making process. In addition, a proactive disclosure can also give the default a further boost 
by transforming the implicit recommendation into an explicit one: Explicit recommendations are a 
well-known motivator of choice behaviour (e.g. O’Keefe, 1997, Ansari, Essegaier, & Kohli, 2000; 
Kinney et al., 1998). 
Moreover, making default nudges transparent could also benefit compliance by reducing 
the negative experiences people have when defaulted. In general, people express greater support 
for nudges, which allow them to reach autonomous decision (e.g enhanced calorie labelling, Reisch 
& Sunstein, 2016). In contrast, the public views defaults less favorably and perceives them as more 
autonomy threatening than other nudges (Jung & Mellers, 2016). This could be because people 
have specific expectations about the quantity and quality of information that should be provided in 
a given communicative attempt (Grice, 1989). When such expectations are not met, people can 
assume that the communicator withholds information, and tries to deceive them (Information 
Manipulation Theory, McCornack et al., 1992). Thus, once people become aware of the choice 
architecture but receive no information on it, they could feel deceived and retaliate (Brehm, 1966; 
1981). A proactive transparency disclosure would eliminate such negative feelings, therefore 
boosting the effectiveness of the default. 
Lastly, a disclosure may also trigger positive inferences about the communicator. 
Specifically, transparent disclosures can foster the perception that the communicator is fair (Steffel, 






communicator’s trustworthiness (Grimmelikhuijsen & Meijer, 2012) and credibility (Eisend, 
2006). A number of findings from communication and persuasion research show that both 
constructs are strongly and positively related to the persuasiveness of influence attempts (Priester 
& Petty, 2003; Hovland & Weiss, 1951; Hovland, Janis, & Kelley, 1953). Therefore, one might 
even expect an increased rather than reduced compliance when the default setter is transparent 
about the influence attempt.  
Overall, there are sufficient reasons to assume that introducing transparency to classical 
default nudges may not reduce their effectiveness, as predicted by Bovens (2009). On the contrary, 
interpreting defaults as a social interaction suggests that transparency can even boost the default 
impact. With the competing theoretical predictions in mind, the next section introduces the current 
literature on transparent defaulting in detail.  
Defaults and Transparency: Empirical findings 
Given the extent of the transparency-effectiveness debate, the empirical evidence on the 
topic is surprisingly scarce. The few existing experimental studies do not support the negative 
theoretical predictions, outlined earlier, but produced mainly null-effects (Bruns et al., 2018; 
Loewenstein et al., 2015, Steffel, Williams, & Pogacar, 2016).  To begin with, Loewenstein and 
colleagues (2015) asked their participants to make a hypothetical end-of-life decision (a choice 
between staying on life support or a painless passage). One or the other alternative was pre-selected 
between subjects. Orthogonally, the researchers varied whether the participants were informed of 
the default before or after making the decision. The results indicated no significant information 
effect on the participants’ choice. However, the authors state that the null finding may reflect the 
respondents’ desire for decision consistency (Falk and Zimmerman, 2013), since the default and 






once with a pre-selected alternative, and the second time imagining that they had not been defaulted 
previously. In addition, the disclosure offered by the experimenters contained very little 
information, related to the default, and was more informative of the experimental design, than of 
the purpose or the presence of the pre-selection. Yet, in a set of studies Steffel, Williams, and 
Pogacar (2016) did not find significant effects of transparency in several defaults either. In their 
first study, the participants imagined they were about to join a fictitious social network, which 
employed an opt-out privacy policy. The network defaulted the participants to either share their 
personal details, or not. In a transparency condition, the participants received information about 
the default’s purpose and behavioral means. However, the disclosure was provided in such a way, 
that it was not clear whether it came from the policy endorser (i.e. the social network), or from the 
experimenters. This creates a methodological issue, since the participants could have inferred that 
the network attempts to hide the default policy, and the experimenters disclosed the attempt, thus 
negating potential positive transparency effects. Likewise, Bruns et al. (2018) studied default 
effects on donation behavior and did not find an advantage of transparency. The participants 
imagined they donated a percentage of their remuneration for completing a task. However, default 
donations were set to a very costly option (80% of the money earned), hence possibly diminishing 
a positive transparency effect by setting a default option outside the participants’ personal latitude 
of acceptance. 
 To summarize, the use of defaulting has received a lot of attention due to its effectiveness 
and the ethical discussion it provoked. While positions on the ethicality of default nudges differ, 
there seems to be a consensus that decisions influenced by defaulting are not entirely autonomous 
(Tom, Nelson, Srzentic, & King, 2007; Hansen & Jespersen, 2013). However, the 






triggered concerns regarding a possible negative effect on the effectiveness of default interventions. 
Yet, a social communication approach suggest that default compliance can benefit from transparent 
disclosures. With opposing theoretical predictions and a limited literature pool, an in-depth 
exploration of the role of transparency in default nudging is still due. The current dissertation aims 
to fill that gap and answer the following research questions: 
a) What is the effect of proactive transparency disclosures on the effectiveness of default 
nudges?  
b) Which are the transparency components within a disclosure, which can bring about an 
effect on default compliance? 
c) If transparent defaults are effective, would the effect stem from providing decision-
relevant information per se, or a combination of both defaulting and information 
provision is needed? 
  Answering these questions can help clarify some of the ethical and pragmatic uncertainties 
related to the implementation of default nudges, and contribute to the ongoing transparency-
effectiveness debate. Ultimately, finding a transparency effect on default compliance can empower 
both scientists and choice architects to employ a more ethical and autonomy – preserving version 
of the classical default nudge. In order to achieve that, a series of experimental studies were 
conducted within the framework of the present dissertation, which addressed the abovementioned 
research questions directly. A summary of the experimental setups and empirical findings per 
question is reported next. Since the findings come from co-authored papers, I will use the pronoun 
“we” throughout most of the following section. The full texts of the respective articles are attached 






Empirical Summary  
 
First and foremost, we needed to establish a working definition of transparency in order to 
systematically measure its effect on default compliance. Combining the insights of Bovens (2009), 
Hansen & Jespersen (2013), and Sunstein (2015), we identified three major transparency 
components, which would situate the construct within a communicative defaulting paradigm. The 
first component represents our belief that a social interaction between default setter and addressee 
can take place only after the presence of the pre-selection has been recognized in the decision 
environment. The second component represents the pragmatic inferences people make about the 
purpose of the pre-selection, once they become aware of its presence. These can be about the 
behavioral outcome, targeted by the endorser (e.g. inferring that the default is set because the policy 
maker them to choose the pre-selected option), or about the end goal of the pre-selection (e.g. 
inferring that a default donation value is set to increase contributions towards a given charitable 
cause). The last component represents the peoples’ beliefs about the general effect of defaulting 
(i.e. how the pre-selected value per se influences their choice). Combining all we defined default 
transparency as an objective intervention characteristic, stemming from a full endorser disclosure 
of the default’s presence, purpose, and behavioral means. Formulated this way, the definition also 
reflected our belief that transparency has to be introduced proactively to a default nudge (in the 
form of a disclosure), so that it can produce an effect on compliance. 
To isolate that effect, we conducted three studies, which allowed for a comparison between 
a classic default nudge and an intervention, in which the endorser proactively disclosed information 
about the pre-selected option (Paunov, Wänke, & Vogel, 2019a). In the first two studies, we also 






proactively. There, the effects of defaulting and transparent defaulting were explored in a 
hypothetical scenario, which also included a third, non-transparent-but-aware condition. In it, the 
participants imagined they retrieve the transparency information from memory (remembering they 
read an article about defaulting), and not from the policy endorser.  Beyond hypothetical scenarios, 
a third study tested the effect of transparency versus non-disclosure for actual choices.  
In the first two studies the participants imagined they log in to check their new online study 
program, when they notice that some of their electives are already pre-selected. In a transparency 
condition, the “university administration” admitted they pre-selected the courses, and that they did 
it to ensure they choose them. In addition, the administrators disclosed the way defaults affect 
behavior in general, namely that people tend to stick with pre-selections when choosing (for the 
full text of all scenarios, see Appendixes for Manuscript 1, A, p. 63 ). In a non-transparent-aware 
condition the participants were asked to imagine they recall the same information, and that based 
on it they infer that the university wanted them to choose the preselected courses. A classic default 
nudge condition obtained a baseline. Endorser trustworthiness was explored as a mediator in the 
first study, and feelings of being deceived in the second.  
 In both studies, a proactive disclosure of a default’s presence, purpose and behavioral 
means significantly increased policy compliance. Moreover, the positive transparency effect was 
present only when the disclosure came from the policy endorser (i.e. the university administration). 
The data also suggested that people may feel deceived when defaulted and the endorser does not 
make that transparent. This was the case independent of whether the participants retrieved 
information about the defaults purpose and functioning from memory, or received no information. 






 A third study replicated the findings with actual choices, where the positive transparency 
effect was even stronger: the default setting more than doubled choices for a particular decision 
option, and making the default transparent quadrupled them.  
  Despite the promising results, however, we knew little about the robustness of the effect 
and the impact of the separate transparency components on compliance. More specifically, it 
remained unclear whether one needed to disclose all components to achieve the desired effect, or 
a single one was sufficient to deliver it. In theory, each component had the potential to bring about 
a positive compliance effect on its own, except for the disclosure of the default’s general effect (i.e. 
that people tend to stick with pre-selected options). There, we hypothesized that the outcome could 
go both ways: If the participants interpret the disclosure as an act of sincerity, than they would be 
more willing to comply (Steffel, Williams, & Pogacar, 2016; Paunov, Wänke, & Vogel, 2019a), 
but if they infer that the nature of defaulting is restricting their decision autonomy, then they would 
retaliate (Brehm, 1966). Therefore, in our next experiment (Paunov, Wänke, & Vogel, 2019b), we 
varied whether people were informed about what the default is intended to achieve (disclosure of 
target behavior), why the endorser wants people to choose the defaulted option (disclosure of 
purpose), and how defaults affect behavior in general (disclosure of general effect) in separate 
conditions. The full text of the respective disclosures is available in Manuscript 2, Table 1 (p. 84). 
 In addition, we wanted to replicate the effect in a more challenging social dilemma setting, 
where choosing the default option went against the self-interest of the participants. Such a setup 
represented traditional defaulting more closely, since default nudges are often aimed at promoting 
altruistic behaviors (Hummer, & Maedche, 2019). Therefore, we employed the services of a paid 






selected option will presumably require them to spend more time working on a task, than they will 
be getting paid for. In reality, everyone worked on a task compatible with their endowment. 
 The results re-affirmed that transparent defaults can be more effective than the conventional 
default nudge. Moreover, the effect survived in a setting, where the participants believed that 
choosing the default option meant sacrificing personal resources for the sake of contributing to a 
prosocial goal (for the participant instructions, see the Supplementary Material for Manuscript 2, 
page 97).  
 Beyond previous data, we demonstrated that disclosing the default’s purpose, both in terms 
of the desired target behavior, and as clarifying the end goal of the default, had a positive effect on 
compliance. Informing the participants about how defaults work in general did not increase choices 
of the default option.  
 Despite replicating the effect and identifying the responsible transparency elements, a 
closer look at the evidence demanded further scrutiny. In particular, we were still to determine 
whether the compliance increase was due to the combined influence of the default and the disclosed 
transparency information, or due to providing decision-relevant information per se. On the one 
hand, persuasion research shows the effects from two information cues can add up (additivity 
hypothesis, Bohner et al., 1995; Maheswaran & Chaiken, 1991) to exert influence on a decision’s 
outcome. Therefore, both the implicit recommendation from the default itself and the transparency 
information might have been necessary to increase the effectiveness of the influence attempt. 
However, evidence from the same vein of research demonstrates that more diagnostic information 
can attenuate the effect of less diagnostic cues on choice (attenuation hypothesis, Chaiken & 
Maheswaran, 1994). Hence, the default may even become obsolete if superseded by the 






Volpp, 2011). If that was the case, we could have obtained a compliance boost by simply informing 
the participants which option is most desirable, even in the absence of a default value. 
 To address the issue, we introduced an informed free-choice condition to our transparent 
defaulting paradigm (Manuscript 3, p. 100). The results showed the transparent default nudge does 
not owe its effectiveness to the mere presence of decision-relevant information. Instead, we 
demonstrated that both defaulting and information provision contribute to the boost in compliance, 
in an additive fashion. The effects were statistically independent (Paunov, Wänke, & Vogel, in 
press). 
 This experiment concluded the empirical phase of the dissertation project. The next section 
presents a summary of the findings and their theoretical and practical implications. The limitations 
















 With conflicting theoretical predictions and scarce empirical evidence, we set out to explore 
the effect from introducing transparency to conventional default nudges. Our main goals were to 
demonstrate the effect, and identify the transparency components responsible for it. Further, we 
wanted to specify whether it originated from the combined influence of defaulting and transparency 
information, or from merely informing people about their choice options. 
 In accordance with previous research (Steffel, Williams, & Pogacar, 2016, Bruns et al., 
2018), we found no evidence of a negative transparency effect on default compliance. On the 
contrary, we were the first to report that proactive transparency can increase the effectiveness of 
default nudges. Across all experiments within the dissertation project, transparent default 
conditions were almost twice as effective as mere defaults. Notably, this was the case for 
hypothetical as well as for actual choices. Therefore, our findings lend support to the general call 
for transparency in nudging interventions (Sunstein, 2015), and indicate that an ethical and 
effective interpretation of the conventional default nudge could be a viable asset for policymaking. 
  Note, that it is indeed the act of revealing one’s intentions as a policymaker, and not 
people’s awareness per se that drives the positive transparency effect on compliance. The effect is 
present only when the policy endorser proactively discloses the transparency information, but not 
when awareness comes from other sources. In the latter instance, participants can feel deceived. In 
our paradigm, a full endorser disclosure eliminated the negative affect. In a broader perspective, 
this finding lends support to the proactive transparency perspective in governance (Darbishire, 






transparent policy making, where mere access to information is provided, and it is up for the 
targeted individuals to “inform” themselves about the specific policy. 
 Further, we showed that not every transparency disclosure can bring about the positive 
transparency effect. Disclosing which target behavior was desired, as well as sharing the default’s 
purpose increased compliance in comparison to a classic default nudge. As to our knowledge, this 
was the first report of an actual beneficial effect of behavioral information in default nudging. 
Previous research has related such disclosures to increased theoretical support for similar nudges 
(Felsen et al., 2013), but not to actual choice behavior. Informing the participants of the defaults’ 
general effect produced no effect on compliance. Possibly, two processes cancelled each other out: 
while participants in this condition perceived the endorser as fair, they also rated the argument 
strength of the disclosure as lowest from all conditions. Such an interpretation might explain the 
lack of reactance manifestations in previous research (Steffel, Williams, & Pogacar, 2016; Bruns 
et al., 2018). 
 In addition, we managed to demonstrate that the transparent default nudge does not owe its 
effectiveness to the mere presence of transparency information. It appears that both defaulting and 
information provision contribute to a positive effect on compliance in an additive manner. In this 
sense, our results provide empirical support in favor of combining nudging with more traditional 
interventions, as recommended in previous literature (Ölander & Thøgersen, 2014). 
Lastly, our findings suggest that the positive impact of transparency persists in cases, when 
choosing the pre-selected option implies a tradeoff between personal gain and promoting an 
altruistic goal. The participants in our last experiments chose to stay with the default at their own 
expense, believing that doing so will help us reach our goals. Therefore, it appears that transparent 






policies aimed at increasing charitable donations at the expense of personal gain (Fiala & Noussair, 
2017) or contributing to environmental protection (Bruns et al., 2018). In a broader sense, the 
results also substantiate the notion that the success of defaulting in altruistic settings has normative 
moral underpinnings (Everett et al., 2015).  
While our findings advocate transparent defaulting as an effective tool for increasing policy 
compliance, there are several limitations to their generalizability. Based on previous research 
(Bruns et al., 2018), we assume that the effect would not persist across settings, in which the costs 
for the targeted individuals exceed their personal latitude of acceptance. If the default value is set 
too high, people tend to ignore the content and valence of simultaneously presented information 
(Goswami & Urminski, 2016). In a transparent default setting, high default costs could be 
interpreted as a more informative cue, thus attenuating the effect of the transparency information. 
Whether that is indeed the case, however, remains an open empirical question. Future research 
could address the issue via setting up orthogonal experimental conditions with default amount and 
transparency information varied between subjects. 
Second, we limit our predictions to settings where the disclosed purpose of a default is 
related to promoting a greater good such as increasing donations or protecting the environment. 
Previous research does not report a positive transparency effect if the defaults’ intent serves the 
default-setters´ strict self-interest (Steffel, Williams, & Pogacar, 2016), or goes against firmly-held 
convictions of the targeted population (Tannenbaum, Fox & Rogers, 2014). 
Next, despite the evidence that the effects of information provision and defaulting are 
statistically independent, it does not automatically follow that they represent different underlying 
processes. For instance, people can still make the same inference in both cases, e.g. to ascribe 






behavior, or because the endorser is perceived as more sincere when information is present. Future 
research needs to conduct a more systematic investigation of the mechanisms behind the effects of 
mere defaulting and transparent default nudges.  
One of the ways to do so would be to approach defaults from a different angle. Note that in 
our research, we adopted a communication perspective, which interprets defaulting as a form of 
social interaction between default setter and recipient. However, other explanations for the default 
effect can provide an alternative to interpreting the positive impact of transparency. A classic one 
is the status quo effect, an umbrella term for a number of decision making biases, which cause 
inertia in situations of choice (Samuelson & Zeckhauser, 1988). According to this perspective, 
people stick with defaults partially because of the transaction costs of opting out. These costs can 
be objective (having to fill in a lengthy opt-out form) or psychological (e.g. anticipated decision 
regret). In some of our experiments (Manuscripts 2 and 3), the transparency disclosure suggests 
that switching from the default means deciding not to help the experimenters. This would render 
opting out selfish, and choosing it could arguably elicit feelings of guilt (Lindsay, 2005). 
Anticipating such a negative affect would represent an additional cost to opting out, thus making 
the default option even more desirable. Future research can explore this possibility by manipulating 
the transparency information, for instance by varying its altruistic component between subjects, 
and measuring rates of anticipated guilt. 
Another theoretical perspective also seems promising for future research. The Query 
Theory of Value Construction (Johnson, Häubl, & Keinan, 2007) regards choice preferences as the 
result of dynamically constructed internal questions, or queries. These queries are executed in 
series, one after the other, and their order and content influence people’s decisions. Queries, which 






advantages of the status quo. Hence, when a certain choice option is defaulted, people are more 
likely to retrieve its positives first, and more often than its negatives (Dinner et al., 2011). This in 
turn skews preferences in favor of the default. Within the paradigm, the positive transparency effect 
could be explained by the salience of the proactive disclosure, and the content of the information 
in it. In our setup, the disclosure is presented simultaneously with the choice options, and it largely 
consists of relevant information about the pre-selection. Arguably, this should make the 
transparency information salient enough to be reflected by the queries, which are on top of the 
consideration order. In this way, the transparency information can weigh choice even more in favor 
of the default. One can test the assumption by subjecting participants to a query listing procedure, 
and measure differences in the order and content of the decision queries between a transparency 
group and a conventional default control. 
Conclusion 
 Despite several shortcomings, we present strong evidence in favor of transparent 
defaulting: an ethical and effective alternative to the conventional default nudge. While it is clear 
that the positive transparency effect requires further investigation, it is also evident that proactive 
disclosures can be the way forward when nudging with defaults. At the very minimum, our research 
shows that the policymakers should not shun from being transparent when influencing others. In 
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From an ethical standpoint, transparency is an essential requirement in public policy 
making. Ideally policy makers are transparent and actively disclose the presence, purpose and 
means of a decision aid. From a practical view, however, transparency has been discussed as 
reducing the effectiveness of decision aids. In the present paper, we elaborate on how transparency 
affects the effectiveness of defaults. In three experiments, we manipulated whether the endorser 
was transparent about the default or not, and assessed participants’ decisions to opt-out or comply. 
Throughout experiments, we find that proactive transparency reduced opt-out rates as compared to 
a non-transparent default condition. Moreover, proactive disclosure of a default reduced opt-out 
rates as compared to informed control groups, where participants imagine they retrieve the default-
related information by themselves (Experiments 1 & 2).  The results further indicate that the lack 
of proactive disclosure may lead the targets to perceive the endorser as less sincere and to feel 
deceived, which in turn hinders the effectiveness of the default. In general, our findings lend 
support to the proactive transparency paradigm in governance, and show that a default-based policy 














Rooted in the popular Nudging paradigm, defaulting quickly became a hot discussion topic 
in both the academic and public domains. Default interventions are characterized by a decision 
situation, in which one of the choice options is pre-selected, but the decision maker retains the 
possibility to actively choose another alternative, i.e. to opt out. In general, people tend to stick to 
the preselected option, making defaulting an effective strategy for influencing choice. Defaults are 
particularly effective in cases, when the decision makers perceive the default option as the 
recommended one (McKenzie, Liersch, and Finkelstein, 2006) or when they postpone the decision 
for a later time (for a comprehensive review, see Willis, 2012).  
Default effects are powerful, and default interventions have been successfully applied by 
various private and governmental institutions as means of increasing policy compliance. Famous 
examples include the organ donation policy default by Johnson and Goldstein (2003), the automatic 
enrollment “Save More Tomorrow” program by Thaler and Benartzi (2004), and Allcott and 
Mullainathan’s energy saving defaults (2010). The success of defaults in policy making seems so 
prominent, that their implementation has even been endorsed in an executive order by US president 
Barack Obama (2015, Sep. 15), in which he encourages “giving particular consideration to the 
selection and setting of default options” (Sec.1, (b), iii). 
The use of defaults however, has also raised concerns about their transparency. On one 
hand, one might conceive of default implementation as crossing the line between choice 
enhancement and manipulation. The target of a default intervention is unaware of the influence 
intent and the means by which the behavioral change is pursued (Hansen and Jespersen, 2013). 
Therefore, some have argued that decisions made under such non-transparent conditions are not 






Goldstein and Johnson, 2012). In response, an increase in transparency was recommended 
(Sunstein, 2015).  
On the other hand, researchers have also contemplated a possible tradeoff between the 
degree of transparency of such interventions, and their effectiveness. Luc Bovens (2009) also 
considered decisions influenced by nudges as non-autonomous, and speculated that when people 
become aware of having been influenced in their choice, they would engage in behaviors that are 
inconsistent with their initial decision. Therefore, he made the theoretical argument that non-
transparent nudges, such as defaults, “work better in the dark” and become increasingly ineffective 
as transparency is introduced. Hence, one can argue that making default interventions transparent 
may be detrimental to their effectiveness. 
It goes without saying that both ethicality and effectiveness are of crucial importance in 
policy making. But are the two really in contradiction to each other? According to prominent 
psychological theorizing, people strive for self-determination (Deci, 1975; Ryan and Deci, 2000) 
and resent limitations to their freedom of choice (Brehm, 1966). In order to reinstall that freedom, 
they would deliberately resist choosing the default option and rather endorse options that are not 
defaulted. Thus, disclosing the influence attempt may easily decrease its impact. 
However, predictions in the opposite direction are also viable. As McKenzie, Liersch, and 
Finkelstein (2006) demonstrate, defaults are perceived as a form of implicit recommendation. The 
pre-selection of an option communicates that the policy maker actually endorses that option. A 
transparent communicator – one who voluntarily discloses the default – further emphasizes that 
she considers a particular option to be the best one. Doing so, the communicator transforms the 






expert advice is known to have a profound effect on informing people’s behaviour (e.g. Kinney et 
al., 1998).  
Moreover, a full endorser disclosure might communicate that the endorser does not want to 
trick the target populace into a certain behaviour (i.e. to choose the pre-selected option), but to help 
people make an informed choice instead. Such disclosure might further account for a positive effect 
on policy compliance: targets may form the impression that the endorser is honest and trustworthy. 
Previous research from political science shows that transparency is positively associated with 
trustworthiness, and also affects policy satisfaction (Park and Blenkinsopp, 2011) and citizen 
compliance (Tyler, 1990, 1998). Research from social psychology shows that a disclosed intent 
can be perceived as working against a communicator’s interest, which further boosts perceptions 
of the communicator’s credibility and makes her appeals more persuasive (Walster, Aronson, and 
Abrahams, 1966). Put together, there is sufficient theoretical argumentation to doubt a negative 
influence of disclosure and to even assume that a voluntary disclosure by the endorser might 
actually boost rather than undermine the effect of defaults.     
Given that default interventions gained much prominence in policy settings (e.g. Johnson 
& Goldstein, 2003; Thaler & Benartzi, 2014), the empirical evidence on the topic is surprisingly 
limited. The few existing experimental studies do not support either perspective, but produced 
mainly nul-effects (Bruns et al., 2018; Loewenstein et al., 2015, Steffel, Williams, & Pogacar, 
2016).  For instance, Loewenstein and colleagues (2015) asked participants to make a hypothetical 
end-of-life decision (a choice between prolonging life at all cost or a set of comforting measures, 
ensuring a smooth end-of life passage). One or the other alternative was defaulted between subjects. 
Orthogonal to the variation of the default, the researchers varied if participants were informed of 






participants were asked to make the same decision again, this time imagining the default had not 
been previously present. The results indicated no significant effect of transparency on the 
participants’ choice. As the authors state, however, the finding may possibly reflect carry-over 
effects, stemming from participants’ desire for decision consistency (Falk and Zimmerman, 2013). 
Yet, in a set of studies Steffel, Williams, and Pogacar (2016) did not find significant effects of 
transparency in several defaults either. Importantly for the present analysis, one of their studies 
actually resembled an institutional policy setting (Study 1a). The participants had to imagine they 
were about to join a fictitious social network, which defaulted them to either share their personal 
details, or not. In some conditions participants received information about the default’s purpose 
and behavioral means. Notably however, the information was provided in such a way, that it was 
not clear whether the research participants attributed its disclosure to the policy endorser (i.e. the 
social network), thus representing proactive transparency, or to the experimenters.  
With opposing theoretical predictions and scarce empirical evidence, we believe that the 
effect of transparency on default effectiveness is worth exploring. More specifically, research in a 
policy setting can benefit from a direct comparison between an uninformed control and an explicit 
endorser disclosure condition. For the purposes of the present research, we define default 
transparency as an objective policy characteristic, stemming from a full endorser disclosure of the 
default’s presence, purpose, and behavioral means. 
 Lastly, we believe that prior designs leave the role of non-disclosure partially unexplored. 
In reality, lack of disclosure does not mean that the decision makers remain oblivious of the 
intervention’s presence or purpose. When information is not readily available, people remain 
capable of retrieving it and drawing an inference to reach a decision. Therefore, we first test the 






in which the participants imagine they retrieve the default-related information by themselves. 
Finally, a third study tests the effect of transparency versus non-disclosure on compliance for actual 
choices. 
Study 1 
The first study compared the default option opt-out rate following full endorser disclosure 
with an uninformed control group. A second control condition was run, in which the participants 
received the same information as in the transparent condition, but imagined they had retrieved it 
by themselves (awareness condition). This setting enabled us to control for the amount of presented 
information, keeping it equivalent to the transparent condition.  
Given people’s tendency to strive for self-determination (Deci and Ryan, 2000), one would 
predict higher opt-out rates in both the transparent condition and the awareness condition, 
compared to the uninformed control group. In fact, defaults may be viewed as particularly 
paternalistic if endorsers reveal their intent.  
Alternatively, a communication perspective holds that transparency evokes inferences 
about the endorser as fair and trustworthy. Such conception would predict lower opt-out rates in 
the transparent condition, compared to the two non-disclosure conditions. Both accounts point to 
the subjective feeling of trusting the endorser versus suspecting the endorser of manipulation. 
Therefore, we measured the extent to which participants perceived the endorser as trustworthy.  
Method 
Participants and design 
 The required sample size for a planned power of 80 per cent (two-tailed, α= .05, Pr(Y = 1 
|X = 1) H0 = .5) was calculated with G*Power (Faul, Erdfelder, Buchner, and Lang, 2009) using 






a probability of opt out under transparency Pr(Y = 1 |X = 1) H0 = .33. This translates into an OR 
= .492, rendering the required sample size to 264 participants. 
Two hundred and ninety-two English-speaking participants were recruited via an 
international online respondent service (210 male, 80 female, 2 unclassified; mean age 33.6 years, 
(SD=9.6)). Each participants was endowed with .30 USD for participation in the study. 
All participants were given a choice scenario where a default was set. Participants were 
randomly assigned to the following three conditions: a transparent condition where the policy 
endorser disclosed setting the default in order to influence participants´ choice, a control group 
which received no further information (non-transparent condition), and a control group that 
received the same information about the default as in the transparent condition, but the participants 
imagined they retrieved said information by themselves (non-transparent aware condition). 
Stimulus material 
The participants were presented with a hypothetical scenario online. They were asked to imagine 
that they had recently enrolled in a university. Upon seeing the course program, they noticed that 
some of their electives had already been pre-selected, but they could change them by filling in a 
paper form and delivering it to the university administration. In the non-transparent condition, the 
participants received no further information. In the transparent condition, the university 
administration notified the participants of the pre-selection. In this condition the university also 
explained how defaults are a means to influence people to make a particular choice, and that this 
was the reason why the university preselected the electives it wanted the students to choose. In the 
non-transparent aware condition, the participants were asked to imagine having recently read an 






Based on this article they would infer that the university wanted them to choose the preselected 
courses. The full text of the scenarios is available in Appendix A. 
Measures 
The main dependent variable was the proportion of people not choosing the default option 
(opt-out rate), coded 0 for staying with it, and 1 for opting out. 
In order to measure the feeling of being able to trust the endorser versus feeling manipulated we 
used an adapted version of the Trust in government scale, adopted from Grimmelikhuijsen and 
Meijer (2012). The questionnaire explores trustworthiness as a multidimensional construct, and has 
three subscales measuring perceived endorser honesty, benevolence, and competence. The 
participants rated their agreement with 15 statements on a 5 point Likert scale, ranging from 
1=”strongly disagree to 5= “strongly agree”. Sample items are: “The university administration is 
professional“ (competence), “The university administration is genuinely interested in the students’ 
well-being” (benevolence), “The university administration approaches students in a sincere way” 
(honesty). In order to ensure that the participants had read all relevant stimulus information, they 
were asked to briefly describe the scenario in an open format. Finally, the participants were 
debriefed and thanked in written form. 
 
 Results and discussion 
Based on the responses to the control question, we excluded twenty-nine  participants for 
not complying with the instruction (responded with “did not read”, “don’t know”, etc.), five  for 
copy-pasting random instruction text, and twelve  for responding incomprehensively in a language, 






Table 1 shows that the full disclosure by the endorser reduces the opt-out rate in comparison 
to the two non-transparent conditions. While roughly every second participant chose to opt out in 
the non-transparent conditions, the opt-out rate dropped to 37.6% when the endorser was 
transparent about the default.   
Table 1  
Proportion of participants deciding to opt out per condition in Study 1 








53.0% (43/81)  
Note: Participants opt-out to stay with default option ratio in parentheses. 
 
To check whether the reduction is significant, we ran a number of binomial logistic 
regressions. The binary decision (stay = 0; opt out = 1) served as our criterion. This criterion was 
predicted from two Helmert-contrasts.  The first Helmert contrast accounted for differences 
between the non-transparent control conditions (non-transparent = non-transparent aware = -.33) 
and the transparent condition (transparent = .67), thus indicating how transparency affects opt out 
rates. The second Helmert-contrast accounted for differences between the two non-transparent 
groups (transparent = 0, non-transparent = -,50, non-transparent aware = .50). It indicates whether 
mere awareness leads to more or less opt out decisions as compared to non-transparent control 
group.  
The analysis yielded the following effects. The first contrast was significant, b = -.726 (SE 
= .285), Wald-χ2(1) = 6.487, p = .011. Thus, the participants in the transparent condition were 
significantly less likely to opt out than those in the non-transparent conditions, in support of the 






 Second, awareness of the default strategy alone did not seem to increase or decrease opt-
out rates in comparison to the non-transparent control group, as is evident from the non-
significance of the second Helmert-contrast, b = -.089 (SE = .338), Wald-χ2(1) = .070, p = .792. A 
summary of the regression coefficients summary is presented in Table 2. 
Table 2  
Summary of Logistic regression Analysis for the effects of transparency and  awareness on opt-
out rates 
Predictors      B   SE Wald df Exp(B) 
Transparency -0.726* 0.285 6.487 1 0.484 
Awareness  -0.089 0.338 0.070 1 0.915 
Constant  0,024 0.136 0.032 1 1.025 
Note: The predictors are Helmert contrast-coded. Transparency compares participants from the transparent condition versus 
participants from the other two conditions. Awareness compares participants from the non-transparent condition against those 
from the non-transparent aware condition. 
*p<.05       
As a next step, we explored the role of trustworthiness. When we regressed trustworthiness 
scores on the same two contrasts, the coefficient for transparency (vs. the other conditions) was not 
significant, b = .117 (SE = .079), p = .138.  Accordingly, we did not find any evidence for an 
indirect effect of disclosure on opt out decisions via trustworthiness,  b = -.662, SE = .057, 95% 
CI[-.233, .010] (5000 replicates), although trustworthiness was an independent predictor of opt-out 
rates,   b = -.378 (SE = .161), Wald-χ2(1) = 5.75, p = .016, indicating that the higher the perceived 
trustworthiness of the endorser, the lower the participant opt-out rates were across conditions. 
In summary, the results confirmed the prediction that institutions can increase policy 
compliance by making default interventions transparent. Notably, the effect appears only when the 






who knew of the possible effect of defaults, but had not been directly informed by the endorser, 
showed no increase or decrease in compliance.  
Despite the clear pattern regarding the impact of transparency on policy compliance, we did 
not find support for the explanatory role of trustworthiness. Though the effect of our manipulation 
on trustworthiness pointed in the expected direction, this effect did not reach conventional levels 
of significance. Before rejecting the explanation, however, it appears worthwhile scrutinizing the 
scale properties with regard to both reliability and construct validity. Indeed, a closer look at the 
trustworthiness scale showed that the item structure did not replicate the original one, rendering 
the aggregation into subscales as doubtful. Looking at the individual item level, it became apparent 
that the participants in the non-transparent conditions agreed less that the university administration 
approached them in a sincere way (M = 3.55, SD = .82), than those in the transparent condition (M 
= 3.80, SD=.75); t = -2.28, p = .023. This suggests that without explicit disclosure defaults might 
indeed be interpreted as an act of insincerity. In turn, this could elicit a feeling of being deceived 
and account for the lower compliance rates amongst the participants in the non-transparent 
conditions. Insights from the field of communication seem to back up such an assumption. In 
general, people have specific expectations about the provision of information (Grice, 1989, 
McCornack, 1992). These include expectations regarding the amount of information that should be 
provided in a communicative attempt. When such expectations are not met, people can assume that 
the communicator withholds information, which can be interpreted as deception (McCornack et 
al., 1992). When people think they are deceived, a range of negative reactions, from disappointment 






 Attending to these considerations, we ran a replication study, in which we replaced the 
trustworthiness scale with a specific measure of the subjective feeling of being deceived. Thus, we 
aim to capture its role as a potential mediator of the transparency effect.  
 
Study 2 
 Study 2 aimed at replicating the findings from Study 1.  The design and materials were to 
the same as those of Study 1, except for small changes on measurement level. Specifically, the 
more general trustworthiness measure was replaced with an explicit measure of feeling deceived. 





We extrapolated the required number of participants based on the effect size from the first study. 
An observed odds ratio of 0.484 and a probability of opt out under transparency of 0.376 rendered 
a required sample of 294 participants. 
Two hundred and eighty-five participants (225 females, 58 males, 2 unclassified) were 
recruited online via a popular social network. The mean age of the participants was 24.9 years (SD 
= 6.03). After participation, respondents indicated whether they want to be entered in a raffle for 
two online shopping vouchers in total value of 30€ (EUR). After the data collection period expired, 









  The presented scenarios and disclosure information were identical to those in Study 1. After 
the decision to change the electives or stay with the pre-selected ones, the participants were 
presented with a self-constructed scale intended to measure the subjective feeling of being 
deceived. It consisted of three positively phrased items, (e.g “Thinking of my interaction with the 
university administration at Albington, I believe they approached me in a sincere way”), and four 
negatively phrased items (e.g. “Thinking of my interaction with the university administration at 
Albington, I believe they tried to trick me”). For all items see Appendix C. Participants indicated 
their agreement with the statements on a 7-point rating scale (1 = “not at all”; 7 = “most definitely”). 
The resulting scale had a very high internal consistency (Cronbach’s α = .89).  
Finally, we assessed whether the participants had read and understood the stimulus 
materials. For an objective and reliable measure of stimulus comprehension, we used a multiple 
choice test instead of an open text format. For a complete list of questions per condition, see 
Appendix B. Correct responses on all questions were required to include a participant in the 
analysis.   
 
Results and discussion 
Forty-eight participants were excluded for providing wrong answers to one or more items of the 
stimulus material attention check. As can be seen in Table 3, the resulting pattern replicated the 
findings of Study 1. Again, disclosure decreased opt out rates, whereas the two non-disclosure 









Table 3  
 
Proportion of participants deciding to opt out per condition in Study 2 








75.9% (60/79)  
Note: Participants opt-out to stay with default option ratio in parentheses. 
 
 The significance of the pattern was tested by means of a binomial logistic regression. The 
binary decision (stay = 0; opt out = 1) was predicted from the same two Helmert contrasts, used in 
our previous study. The first contrast accounted for differences between the non-transparent groups 
(non-transparent and non-transparent aware = -.33) and the transparency group (transparent = .67), 
indicating how transparency affects opt-out rates. The second Helmert-contrast (adjusted for group 
size) accounted for differences between the two non-transparent groups (non-transparent = -.55, 
transparent = 0, non-transparent aware = .45). This coefficient indicated whether default awareness 
leads to more or less opt-out decisions as compared to the non-transparent control group.  
In line with the results from our first experiment, the participants in the transparency 
condition were significantly less likely to opt out, b = -.634 (SE = .301), Wald-χ2(1) = 4.43, p = 
.035, than those in the non-transparent conditions.  As expected, the second planned contrast (non-
transparent versus non-transparent aware condition) revealed no significant differences between 
groups, b = -.236 (SE = .391), Wald-χ2(1) = .366, p = .545. Logistic regression coefficients 










Summary of Logistic regression Analysis for the effects of transparency and awareness on 
opt-out rates in Study 2 
Predictor B S.E. Wald df Exp(B) 
Transparency -,634* ,301 4,43 1 ,530 
Awareness -,236 ,391 ,366 1 ,789 
Constant 1,308 ,150 47,7 1 2,823 
Note: The predictors are weighted Helmert contrasts. Transparency compares participants from the transparent 
condition versus participants from the other two conditions. Awareness compares participants from the non-
transparent condition against those from the non-transparent aware condition.  
*p< .05. 
 
As demonstrated in Table 5, the participants’ scores of feeling deceived were lowest in the 
transparent condition, whereas they were almost identical in the non-transparent conditions. 
Table 5    
Mean scores of feeling deceived per condition in Study 2 
Condition transparent non-transparent non-transparent aware 
Feeling 
deceived 
3.01 3.35 3.44 
(-1.23) (-1.2) (-1.13) 
Note: Standard deviations in parentheses. 
 
To check the significance of the pattern, we regressed the participants’ deception scores on 
the two Helmert contrasts. As expected, the participants in the transparent condition felt 
significantly less deceived and manipulated than those in the non-transparent groups, b = -.332, SE 
= .138, p = .017, 95%CI [-.604; -.061]. Participants who imagined to have discerned all default 
information by themselves did not feel more or less manipulated than those in the other non-






Next, we tested whether the subjective feeling of being deceived mediates the effect of 
transparency on policy compliance. For that purpose, we used four binomial regression models and 
the SPSS PROCESS macro (Hayes, 2013). The first model indicated that transparency was 
significantly negatively related to opt-out, b = -.634, SE =.312, p = .032, 95% CI [-1.261; -.0421]. 
The second demonstrated that transparency led to a decrease of the subjective feeling of being 
deceived, b = -.332, SE =.137, p = .017, 95% CI [-.604; -.061]. In turn, feeling deceived accounted 
for an increase in opt-out rates, b = .464, SE =. 166, p = .005, 95% CI [.138; .791]. Lastly, when 
the subjected feeling of being deceived and transparency were pooled together in a regression 
model, the relationship between transparency and opt-out rates was no longer significant, b = -.497, 
SE = .310, p = .108, 95% CI [-1.106; .111]. Bootstrap confidence intervals derived from 5000 
replicates also demonstrated that the indirect effect coefficient was significant, b = -.154, SE = 
.082, 95% CI [-.362; -.033], which supported the hypothesis that the relationship between 
transparency and opt-out rates is mediated by the subjective feeling of being deceived. 
As previously, the results show that institutions can increase policy compliance by making 
default manipulations transparent. Importantly, disclosure by an endorser safe-guards against 
people becoming suspicious or feeling manipulated, which in turn makes them more likely to 
comply with the default. 
Despite the clear evidence for a beneficial effect of transparency on default compliance, 
limitations may arise from the fact that the choices in our setup were hypothetical. Although using 
scenarios is a common approach to assessing transparency effects (Loewenstein et al., 2015, 
Steffel, Williams, and Pogacar, 2016), it cannot be guaranteed that effects for hypothetical choices 
would be observed for actual choices, as well. In fact, recent research in a different hypothetical 






these effects do not necessarily transfer to default compliance (Steffel, Williams and Pogacar, 
2016). In order to test whether transparency effects on compliance rates are evident in actual choice 
behavior, we conducted a third experimental study. 
 
Study 3 
As in the previous studies, the moderating role of transparency on default compliance was 
tested in a university decision context, yet with actual choices. Participants chose between several 
studies in which they could volunteer to participate. The studies were described in terms of their 
different durations. Analogously to the previous studies, we realized a transparent and a non-
transparent default condition, in both of which the middle study duration (8 to10 minutes) was pre-
selected. Different from the previous studies, we also ran a free choice (non-default) condition in 
order to isolate a default effect and possible participant preferences for the middle study duration.  
Participants & Design 
Participants 
A convenience sample of one hundred and seventy-nine participants (131 females, 47 males, 1 
unclassified) was obtained via a popular social network. The mean age of the participants was 25.8 
years (SD=7.03). They were randomly assigned to one of the three between-participant conditions 
(transparent default vs. non-transparent default vs. free choice).  A subsequent sensitivity analysis 
revealed that given N = 179, 1-ß = 0.8, α = .05, and an observed Pr(Y = 1 |X = 1) H0 = .46 our 
study was sufficiently sensitive to detect a minimum effect size (and odds ratio) of 2.132.  
After participation, respondents indicated whether they wanted to be entered in a raffle for 
two online shopping vouchers in total value of 20€ (EUR). After the data collection period expired, 






Materials & Procedure 
On a social media platform an invitation to participate in psychological research was posted and 
the respective link was provided. Participants who clicked on the link were informed that there 
were several studies from which they could choose, and that the studies differed in content and 
duration. Only the duration was provided for each study without further content description. 
Participants were also informed that the reward for their participation was independent of the 
duration of the study they chose to complete. The following five choice options were listed: “< 5 
minutes”, “5 to 8 minutes”; “8 to 10 minutes”; “10 to 12 minutes”; and “more than 12 minutes”. In 
both default conditions, the middle “8 to 10 minutes” study duration category was pre-selected. In 
the transparent condition, the pre-selection was accompanied by a notification explaining the 
purpose and the behavioral means of the pre-selection (the full text of the stimulus material per 
condition is available in Appendix D). In a free choice condition none of the options was pre-
selected. In order to preserve the participants’ time resources, no actual study was administered. 
Upon indicating their choice, all respondents were redirected to a page, where they were thoroughly 
debriefed about the procedure and purpose of the experiment, and could participate in the prize 
raffle. 
 
Results and Discussion 
 Descriptive results are reported in Table 6. In the transparent condition, 46.6% of the 
participants chose to stay with the default (vs. 53.4% who opted out), while in the non-transparent 
default condition only 27.1%% chose this option, but 72.9% opted out. For a comparison standard, 









Percentages of decisions to stay versus opt out from designated option per condition in 
Study 3 
Condition transparent default non-transparent default free choice 
Stay 46,6%(27/58) 27,1%(16/59) 11,3% (7/62) 
    
Opt-out 54,3% (41/58) 72,9% (43/59) 88,7% (55/62) 
Note: Proportion of participants who chose the option pre-selected in the default conditions upper 
row) vs. proportion of participants who chose an alternative option (lower row).   
 
 For a test of significance, choices (coded 0 = stay/middle option; 1 = opt out/other option) 
were predicted from two Helmert contrasts in a binomial logistic regression. The contrasts 
indicated whether there was a default or not (transparent default and non-transparent default = .33; 
free choice = -.67) and whether the default was transparent or not (transparent default = .50, free 
choice = 0, non-transparent default = -.50). Coefficient summary is available in Table 7. 
Table 7  
Summary of logistic regression analysis for the effects of default and transparency on 
choice in Study 3 
Predictor B S.E. Wald df Exp(B) 
Default 1.498** 0.446 11.231 1 4.472 
Transparency 0.85* 0.393 4.664 1 2.34 
Constant -1.058 0.186 32.022 1 0.347 
Note: The predictors are Helmert contrasts. Default compares participants from the default conditions versus 
participants from the free choice condition. Transparency compares participants from the non-transparent 
default condition against those from the transparent default condition.   
**p<.01 
  *p< .05 
 
 The first contrast was significant, b = 1.498 (SE = 0.446), Wald-χ2(1) = 11.23, p = .001, 
showing that defaults systematically increase the choice of the pre-selected option over a free 






proportion of participants choosing the defaulted option as compared to the non-transparent default 
condition: b = 0,850 (SE = 0.393), Wald-χ2(1) = 32.02, p = .031. Thus, even in case of actual 
choices, making a default transparent increased its efficiency. It should be noted that the respective 
option was not highly favored a priori. The default setting more than doubled choices for this 
option, and making the defaulting strategy transparent quadrupled it.    
 
General Discussion 
Across three experiments, we demonstrated that that the full disclosure of a default’s 
presence, purpose and behavioral means increased policy compliance. Notably, this was the case 
for hypothetical as well as for actual choices. Such finding supports the call for transparency in 
nudging interventions (Sunstein, 2015), showing that a transparent default may still be effective.  
  Our data also suggest that to some extent, people may feel deceived when a default is 
presented, no matter whether they manage to retrieve all default-related information or not. A full 
disclosure by the endorser is a possible remedy against such inferences. In a broader sense, such 
finding lends support to the proactive disclosure perspective in governance (Darbishire, 2010), and 
shows that proactive transparency can be a beneficial tool for increasing policy compliance in 
cases, where the traditional (a.k.a. reactive) open access approaches fail.   
While these findings advocate transparency as a tool to increase default efficacy, there are 
some limitations to their generalizability. First, transparency may not always yield the inference 
that the endorser is fair. For instance, we would expect that disclosure effects depend on whether 
the disclosure is perceived as being voluntarily made. If one perceives the disclosure to be given 
by obligation, for example due to a specific regulation which requires it, the introduction of 






purpose is compatible with the receiver’s interest. That is, receivers might be willing to comply 
with defaults that serve themselves or an institution they are willing to support. Disclosing that the 
default serves the default-setters vested self-interests at the cost of the receiver may yield smaller 
if not detrimental effects (cf. Steffel, Williams, and Pogacar, 2016). Likewise, transparency may 
not increase default compliance if it discloses inacceptable costs. Bruns et al. (2018) studied default 
effects on donation behavior and did not find an advantage of transparency. Different from the 
present study, however, defaults in Bruns et al. (2018) were set to a very costly option (i.e. donate 
80% of the money earned). Arguably, transparency affects the willingness to comply, but only 
within the personal latitude of acceptance. Taken together, these considerations might imply that 
transparency is most beneficial for defaults nudging people to the better – which is a basic 
requirement in the Nudging paradigm. 
However, this does not exclude the possibility of a detrimental effect of endorser disclosure 
on the effectiveness of non-transparent nudges in general (cf. Bovens, 2009). Behavioral 
interventions which directly influence the attributes of our choice alternatives (e.g., decreasing 
portions or plate sizes in cafeterias) are much more difficult to detect, and can thus be perceived as 
more intrusive when disclosed. Perhaps such interventions would still work best in the dark, but 
this stands to be seen. 
Conclusion 
In summary, the present research adds to the available literature on default effects, and 
demonstrates that default-based policies can be both ethical and effective at the same time. Doing 
so, it contributes to the ongoing ethicality-effectiveness debate, showing that at least in some 
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Stimulus Material Studies 1 and 2 per condition. 
Non-transparent condition: 
Please read the text below carefully and answer the question honestly. There is no right or wrong 
answer, just pick the answer you want. Once you are ready, please click the “Next” button. 
 
Shortly after finishing your bachelor studies, you find a suitable master’s program at another 
university. Not before long, you get accepted and move to campus. As soon as you get your 
online university credentials, you browse through the courses, included in the program. You 
notice that besides being enrolled in the mandatory courses, you have also been registered for a 
few elective ones. 
 
The electives you are registered for vary in content and length. 
 
Underneath the elective course descriptions you see the following information:  
 
What do you do next? 
Stay with the pre-selected courses 







Please read the text below carefully and answer the question honestly. There is no right or wrong 
answer, just pick the answer you want. Once you are ready, please click the “Next” button. 
 
Shortly after finishing your bachelor studies, you find a suitable master’s program at another 
university. Not before long, you get accepted and move to campus. As soon as you get your 
online university credentials, you browse through the courses, included in the program. You 
notice that besides being enrolled in the mandatory courses, you have also been registered for a 
few elective ones. 
 
The electives you are registered for vary in content and length. 
 
Underneath the elective course descriptions you see the following information:  
 
 
What do you do next? 
Stay with the pre-selected courses 







Non-transparent aware condition: 
Please read the text below carefully and answer the question honestly. There is no right or wrong 
answer, just pick the answer you want. Once you are ready, please click the “Next” button. 
 
Shortly after finishing your bachelor studies, you find a suitable master’s program at another 
university. Not before long, you get accepted and move to campus. As soon as you get your 
online university credentials, you browse through the courses, included in the program. You 
notice that besides being enrolled in the mandatory courses, you have also been registered for a 
few elective ones. 
The electives you are registered for vary in content and length. 
Underneath the elective course descriptions you see the following information:  
 
You remember that you recently stumbled over a scientific article by Johnson and Goldstein 
(2013). The authors showed that when people face a decision, they would often stay with the option 
which is pre-selected. Thus, you infer that the university administration has pre-selected the 
elective courses for you, since they want to direct you towards choosing them. 
 
What do you do next? 
Change the pre-selected courses to the other alternatives 








Control questions study 2 (per condition). 
 
Non-transparent condition 
Please, answer the following questions about the situation you were confronted with in the 
beginning: 
In the presented situation, we asked you to imagine, that...  
-you were a teacher in a foreign university  
-you recently paid a high tuition fee in a university  
-you enrolled in a master’s program  
 
When you had a look at the courses you needed to follow...  
-you had to choose all your elective courses by yourself  
-some of the elective courses were already chosen for you  
-some of the elective courses were past deadline for enrollment  
 
A university disclaimer underneath the course descriptions stated that...  
-you can change the preselected electives after you hand in a change form in person  
-you cannot change the preselected electives  










Non-transparent aware condition:  the three questions from the non-transparent condition plus: 
 
After you read about the enrollment procedure at Albington, you remembered about an 
article, which explains  
-that when people face a decision, they will often stay with the option, which is preselected for 
them  
-that when people face a decision, they will often select the option, which is best for them  
-that when people face a decision, they will often postpone their choice for a later time  
 
Based on the information in the article you remembered reading, you inferred that  
-the university administration preselected the elective courses for you, since they wanted you to 
make an active choice  
-the university administration preselected the elective courses for you by mistake  
-the university administration preselected the elective courses for you, since they wanted you to 












Transparent condition: the three questions from the non-transparent condition plus: 
 
The university administration at Albington posted a disclaimer, which contained 
information about their enrollment policy. What was their enrollment policy based on?  
-on the fact, that when people face a decision, they will often stay with the option, which is 
preselected for them  
-on the fact, that when people face a decision, they will often select the best option for them  
-on the fact, that when people face a decision, they will often postpone their decision for a later 







Subjective feeling of being deceived measure (Chronbach’s α= .89) 
Participants indicated their agreement with seven statements on a seven-point Likert scale, 
anchored from 1(not at all) to 7 (most definitely). Three of the items were positively worded and 
their scores consequently reversed. 
 
Thinking of my interaction with the university administration at Albington, I believe they… 
 
Were open with me…………………………….not at all (1)           most definitely (7)  
Tried to trick me……………………………… not at all (1)           most definitely (7)  
Approached me in a sincere way………………not at all (1)           most definitely (7)  
Made an attempt to swindle me…………… ….not at all (1)           most definitely (7)             
Were trying to mislead me……………………..not at all (1)           most definitely (7)  

















Stimulus material Study 3 per condition. 
Transparent default condition 
Welcome to the experimental database of the Department of Economic and Consumer 
Psychology  
We have a large selection of studies that you can work on. The studies have different 
content and duration.  
Please select a category of studies from the options below. The categories are ordered 
according to the duration of the studies they contain. Once you have selected a category, 
you will be randomly assigned a study of the respective duration.  
Please note the following: based on the results of Johnson und Goldstein (2003) we know that in decision 
situations, people often stick with a choice option, which is preselected for them. Therefore, we have 
preselected a category for you, since we would want you to choose a study from this category. 
Once you have completed the study, you can enter a raffle to win two 10 € Amazon 
vouchers. Please note that you will only receive one entry, no matter if you have completed 
a long or a short study.  
Category A (< 5 min) 
Category B (5 – 8 min) 
Category C (8 – 10 min) 
Category D (10 – 12 min) 





















Welcome to the experimental database of the Department of Economic 
and Consumer Psychology  
We have a large selection of studies that you can work on. The studies have different 
content and duration. 
Please select a category of studies from the options below. The categories are ordered 
according to the duration of the studies they contain. Once you have selected a category, 
you will be randomly assigned a study of the respective duration. 
Once you have completed the study, you can enter a raffle to win two 10 € Amazon 
vouchers. Please note that you will only receive one entry, no matter if you have completed 
a long or a short study. 
Category A (< 5 min) 
Category B (5 – 8 min) 
Category C (8 – 10 min) 
Category D (10 – 12 min) 

















Free choice condition 
Welcome to the experimental database of the Department of Economic 
and Consumer Psychology  
We have a large selection of studies that you can work on. The studies have different 
content and duration. 
Please select a category of studies from the options below. The categories are ordered 
according to the duration of the studies they contain. Once you have selected a category, 
you will be randomly assigned a study of the respective duration. 
Once you have completed the study, you can enter a raffle to win two 10 € Amazon 
vouchers. Please note that you will only receive one entry, no matter if you have completed 
a long or a short study. 
Category A (< 5 min) 
Category B (5 – 8 min) 
Category C (8 – 10 min) 
Category D (10 – 12 min) 
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 Default options have been successfully utilized in influencing behavior across multiple 
domains. Recent empirical evidence advocated the induction of transparency to default 
interventions as an effective tool for increasing policy compliance (Paunov, Wänke & Vogel, 
2018). However, the roles of the different transparency components in achieving the effect remain 
unexplored.  
 In an experimental study, we measured the effects of three different transparency 
disclosures on default effectiveness. The default’s target behavior, the default’s purpose, and the 
way defaults work were disclosed in separate conditions. Our results show that transparency 
significantly increases compliance to the default nudge. In addition, we provide an insight as to 
















  Influencing others has long been a central theme in social psychology (for reviews see 
Cialdini & Goldstein, 2004; Pratkanis, 2007; van der Pligt & Vliek, 2016). Over time, many 
influence and persuasion theories have been proposed (Eagly & Chaiken, 1993; Crano & Prislin, 
2008; Vogel & Wänke, 2016) and numerous influence techniques have been researched and applied 
(Cialdini, 2016; Goldstein, Martin & Cialdini, 2008). Recent years saw a new interest in the topic 
as well as a perspective shift when Thaler and Sunstein (2008) propagated “nudging” people by 
engineering the choice environment in a manner that presumably facilitates pro-social and self-
beneficial behavior. While a precise operational definition of nudging is still lacking (Marteau, 
Ogilvie, Ronald, Suhrcke, & Kelly, 2011), nudgers, also known as choice architects, have 
successfully implemented nudge-based interventions in institutional and private policies across 
multiple domains.  
 One of the most effective means of nudging is the use of default options. Typically, the 
decision makers are presented with an array of choice options, one of which is pre-selected. 
However, they retain the possibility to actively choose another alternative, i.e. to opt-out from the 
default. Generally, people tend to stick to the preselected option, thus making defaults an effective 
strategy for influencing choice. Default-based interventions have been successful in promoting pro-
social behavior in a wide range of settings, including organ donation decisions (Johnson & 
Goldstein, 2003), retirement savings (Thaler & Benartzi, 2004), and energy conservation (Allcott 
& Mullainathan, 2010). At first glance, defaults seem to capitalize on people’s inertia, which makes 
them stick to the pre-selected option, but as elaborated later, defaults also involve a social 
component (McKenzie, Liersch, and Finkelstein, 2006). 
The implementation of defaults, however, has also raised concerns about the degree to 






intervention is unaware of the influence attempt and the way it brings about the desired behavioral 
change (Hansen & Jespersen, 2013), some researchers have argued that defaults limit people’s 
autonomy and their ability to exercise informed choice (Smith, Goldstein & Johnson, 2013).        In 
line with this notion, Jung and Mellers (2016) demonstrated that defaults were viewed less 
favorably and were perceived as more autonomy threatening than other nudges. Thus, an ethical 
perspective calls for transparency in default interventions.  
 Yet, researchers have also expressed concerns that transparency might harm the 
effectiveness of default nudges. Meta-analytic evidence by Wood and Quinn (2003) indicates that 
being forewarned about an upcoming attitude influence appeal makes people bolster their attitudes 
as a form of a defensive response. Consequently, such defensive position may prompt retaliation 
against a given choice architecture, provided that the invigorated attitudes go against it. Therefore, 
Krijnen, Tannenbaum, and Fox (2017) speculated that once an influence attempt is disclosed, 
people can actively choose to oppose the promoted course of action. Bovens (2009) also speculated 
that once people became aware that there is an attempt to influence their choice, they can counteract 
it by engaging in behaviors that are inconsistent with the purpose of the intervention and/or their 
initial decision. Hence, he argued that non-transparent nudges, such as defaults, work “better in the 
dark” and should become largely ineffective as transparency is introduced. Although Bovens did 
not test his assumptions, reactance theory (Brehm, 1966) and people’s strife for self-determination 
(Deci, 1975; Ryan & Deci, 2000) would make similar, even stronger predictions, linking resistance 
to the mere presence of an influence attempt.   
 On the other hand, social psychological perspectives challenge the considerations regarding 
ethicality and transparency. In most social interactions, a communicator’s choice of message type 






& McKenzie, 2006). If one is to construe the default setting as a form of a social interaction 
between the default setter and the targeted population, then one can assume that setting the default 
in itself can communicate information about the default setters’ preferences and intentions. In fact, 
McKenzie and colleagues (2006) demonstrated that when defaulted, the targeted individuals were 
able to recognise that a particular choice option is made easier to adopt, and that the default-setters 
wanted them to choose that option. Therefore, the authors concluded that the default setting per se 
was perceived as a form of an implicit recommendation, which was sufficient to trigger a desirable 
response. Moreover, insights from persuasion research (Persuasion Knowledge Model; Friestad & 
Wright, 1994; Kirmani & Campbell, 2009) show that people are not only capable of recognizing 
the influence agent’s intent, but can also construe beliefs about her or his strategies and tactics, 
synthesizing those in a form of unique persuasion knowledge. In this sense, it is not entirely prudent 
to think of defaults as completely non-transparent and unethical. Even when no additional 
information is conveyed, people seem to recognize the default as an influence attempt and 
extrapolate the default’s setter’s attitudes and intentions, thus (at least partially) retaining their 
ability to make an informed choice. 
  Adopting such a perspective, one would predict that a disclosure of the default strategy may 
not harm the effectiveness of a default as Bovens (2009) predicted, but might even boost its impact. 
Since people are capable of recognizing defaults as implicit influence attempts, a transparent 
communicator – one who proactively discloses the default setting– can transform the implicit 
recommendation into an explicit one, and can thus give the default a further boost: Explicit 
recommendations are known to have a strong effect on informing people’s behaviour (e.g. 
O’Keefe, 1997; Ansari, Essegaier, & Kohli, 2000; Kinney et al., 1998). Moreover, an explication 






positive inferences about the communicator. Specifically, transparent disclosures can foster the 
perception that the communicator is fair (Steffel, Williams & Pogacar, 2016) and sincere (Paunov 
et al., 2018), which is an integral part of the communicator’s credibility (Eisend, 2006). A plethora 
of findings from communication and persuasion research show that source credibility has a strong 
persuasive impact (e.g. Hovland & Weiss, 1951; Hovland, Janis, & Kelley, 1953; for a meta-
analysis see Wilson and Sherrell, 1993). Therefore, one might even expect an increased rather than 
reduced compliance when the default setter is transparent about the influence attempt.  
 The empirical evidence on transparency is mixed, but so far the respective research has 
found no evidence of a negative impact on default effectiveness (Loewenstein et al., 2015; Steffel 
et al., 2016; Bruns et al., 2018). Instead, a recent experiment by Paunov, Wänke, and Vogel (2018) 
demonstrated that transparency can actually increase the effectiveness of several default nudges. 
Building on the theoretical insights of McKenzie et al. (2006) and Hansen and Jespersen (2013), 
Paunov and colleagues took an eclectic approach to conceptualizing transparency. They defined it 
as an objective intervention characteristic, whereby the endorser fully discloses the default’s 
presence, its purpose, and its general effect. The authors’ main reasoning was that by proactively 
installing transparency, the policy makers would communicate that they do not intend to trick 
people into the desired behavior, but to help them make an informed choice instead. Across three 
experimental studies, the endorser´s proactive disclosure of the default’s presence, purpose, and 
general effect significantly increased compliance in comparison to free choice and a traditional 
default condition. However, while this transparency induction proved successful in eliciting the 
desired choice, the individual role of each transparency component remains unclear. Does one 
really need to disclose all three components, or is a single one sufficient to increase compliance?  






present research provides a more systematic test of different transparency disclosures, namely the 
what, the why and the how. More specifically, we vary whether people are explicitly informed (a) 
what the default is intended to achieve (disclosure of target behavior), (b) why the endorser wants 
people to choose the defaulted option (disclosure of purpose), and (c) how defaults affect behavior 
in general (disclosure of general effect). 
 In principle, each category has the potential to deliver a positive effect on its own. First, 
one can assume that clarifying the default target behavior may trigger an increase in compliance 
simply because it makes the respective behavior more obvious and salient. Generally, people react 
positively to the presence of exact behavioral information, and express more support for nudges, 
which provide it (Felsen et al., 2013).  
 Second, disclosing the reason why the default should be chosen can provide people with a 
valid justification for complying.  Compliance and willingness to cooperate increase significantly 
when a request (Langer et al., 1978; Bohm & Hendricks, 2010) or an influence attempt (Becker, 
1978) is accompanied by higher levels of justification. In addition, disclosing the reason behind 
the default can be especially beneficial, if it represents a strong argument in favor of complying: A 
number of findings from persuasion research reveal a positive link between the strength of the 
arguments, which constitute a given influence attempt, and its persuasiveness (Chaiken, 1980; 
Petty & Cacioppo, 1979). Therefore, disclosing the default’s purpose can not only help people 
justify complying, but can also contribute to the persuasiveness of the disclosure, provided that it 
presents a strong argument in favor of the pre-selection. 
 Lastly, a proactive disclosure of the default’s influence on people’s decision-making may 






the targeted population in a sincere way (Steffel et al., 2016; Paunov, et al., 2018). Put together, 
either transparency component may be the sole cause of an increase in compliance.  
 However, there is also the possibility that in isolation, certain transparency components 
may fail to produce a positive effect or could even be detrimental to the default’s effectiveness. 
Prominent psychological theorizing asserts that people strive for self-determination (Deci, 1975; 
Ryan & Deci, 2000) and resent limitations to their freedom of choice (Brehm, 1966). Presumably, 
an explicit disclosure of the default’s general effect is most likely to trigger opposition. Informing 
people that they generally tend to stay with a defaulted option, once such is set, can render it 
especially salient that their choice is not entirely autonomous. 
 In sum, despite the recent evidence that an eclectic disclosure of all transparency 
components can increase the effectiveness of a default nudge (Paunov et al., 2018), little is known 
about the robustness of the effect and the exact impact of the separate transparency components. 
The present research aims to fill these gaps. First, we intend to replicate the positive effect of 
transparency on default compliance, introducing a more challenging social dilemma setting, where 
choosing the default option goes against the strict self-interest of the participants. Second, we aim 
to disentangle the effects of the different transparency constituents via setting up separate 
experimental conditions for the respective disclosures.  
The present research 
 An online experiment was conducted, which explored the effects of transparency on default 
nudge compliance in the context of devoting time (personal cost) to promote participation in 
scientific research. Compliance rates across five experimental conditions were compared between 
participants. A free-choice condition obtained a baseline. In a second condition a conventional 






previously: a target behavior disclosure condition (“what”), a disclosure of purpose condition 
(“why”), and a general effect disclosure condition (“how”). The effectiveness of the default 
intervention was isolated by comparing the free-choice condition against the four default 
conditions, where we predicted a positive effect of defaulting on willingness to participate in 
scientific research. The main effect of transparency was derived from contrasting the conventional 
default condition against the three transparent default conditions. In congruence with Paunov et al. 
(2018), we predicted a positive effect of transparency on default effectiveness. 
 As discussed previously, each type of disclosure has the potential to bring about the desired 
behavioral change either in isolation, or in a combination with other disclosures. Based on our 
theoretical reasoning, we assume that disclosing the defaults purpose, or providing information 
about the expected participant behavior will increase compliance with the default. Given the 
argument that disclosing the default’s general effect can trigger resistance (Bovens, 2009; Brehm, 
1966), we expect that such disclosure is less likely to produce a positive effect, and can even hinder 
the default’s effectiveness.  Lastly, in an explorative manner, we assessed the participants’ scores 
on two variables: disclosure argument strength and perceived endorser deceptiveness. As theorized 
previously, differences between the strength of the arguments in the respective disclosures can 
provide an indication as to how justifiable compliance is, or how persuasive the disclosures are. 
Perceived endorser deceptiveness, on the other hand, has been previously associated with 
compliance in Paunov et al., (2018) experiments, and may help explain the main transparency 










Participants and design 
 The required sample size for a planned power of 80 per cent (1-ß = 0.8, two-tailed, α= .05), 
was calculated with G*Power (Faul, Erdfelder, Buchner, and Lang, 2009) using odds ratios (ORs). 
The expected effect size was extrapolated based on the results of Paunov et al. (2018). An odds 
ratio of 2.132 and a probability of opting out under transparency Pr(Y = 1 |X = 1) H0 = .46 rendered 
a required sample of 228 participants. Conservatively, 311 English-speaking participants were 
recruited via an online respondent panel (198 females (64, 3%), 109 males (35,4%), 1 unspecified 
(0,3%), mean age 33.5 years, (SD=11,3)), and were randomly assigned to the five experimental 
conditions. Each participant was paid £ 0.45 for participating in the study. 
Materials and procedure 
 Respondents who decided to take part in our research were informed that there were several 
studies they could choose from, and that the studies differed in content and duration. Only the 
duration was provided for each study without any content description. The following five choice 
options were listed: “< 3 minutes”, “3 to 5 minutes”; “5 to 7 minutes”; “7 to 9 minutes”; and “more 
than 9 minutes”. Across all five conditions and simultaneously with the presentation of the choice 
options, the participants had been informed that they would be paid for doing a 5 minute study, 
independent of the duration of the study they chose. Therefore, choosing the first option provided 
the opportunity to spend less than 5 minutes (thus maximizing the participant’s profit), while the 
second allowed for spending a maximum of 5 minutes in order to break even without violating the 
contract. Because we wanted to default an option that was not attractive a priori, in all four default 
conditions, the “5 to 7 minutes” study duration category was pre-selected. A choice of this option 






scientific research. In the three transparent default conditions, the pre-selection was accompanied 
by a disclosure, which clarified either the expected participant behavior (target behavior 
disclosure), the purpose of the default (default purpose disclosure), or the way in which defaults 
affect behavior (general effect disclosure). In the non-transparent default condition, the “5 to 7 
minutes” option was pre-selected, unaccompanied by transparency information. In the free choice 
condition none of the choice options was pre-selected. The respective conditions and disclosures 
are presented in Table 1. The exact wording of our general instruction is provided in part 1 of the 
Supplementary Material (SM). 
After indicating their choice, the participants filled in an exploratory post-questionnaire, 
which measured scores on two constructs: disclosure argument strength and perceived endorser 
deceptiveness. Disclosure argument strength was assessed across the transparent default conditions 
to test which disclosure(s) represented a stronger argument in favor of the pre-selection. The 
perceived endorser deceptiveness measure was administered across all conditions to probe for a 
possible explanation of the positive transparency effect. After that, the participants responded to 
several multiple-choice questions, designed to capture the extent to which they had read and 
understood the stimulus information. Upon providing some demographic information, the 
participants were redirected to an unrelated task, which took approximately 3 minutes to complete. 
Finally, all respondents were thoroughly debriefed about the purpose of the experiment, re-affirmed 










Table 1. Overview of the experimental conditions and disclosures.  
Condition Disclosure 
Default & target  
behavior disclosure  
Please note the following: we would want you to choose Category C (5-7 min). 
Therefore, we have preselected this category. 
Default & purpose  
disclosure  
Please note the following: with choosing Category C (5-7 min), you guarantee 
that we will be able to accomplish our research objectives. Therefore, we have 
preselected this category. 
Default & general  
effect disclosure  
Please note the following: we know that in decision situations, people often 
stick with a choice option which is preselected for them. Therefore, we have 




Free choice none 
 
Measures 
 The main dependent variable was choice of the target option, coded 0 for not choosing 
it/opting out, and 1 for choosing it/staying with the default. After making their choice, the 
participants were presented with the exploratory post-choice questionnaire, where six items (α = 
.89) captured the degree to which the participants felt deceived by the endorser (e.g. “When I 
consider how the choice of categories was presented to me, I think that the experimenters tried to 
manipulate me.”). In the transparency conditions, seven additional items (α =.91) measured how 
strong the arguments for setting up the default in the respective disclosures were (e.g. “The 
argument, which the experimenters made for pre-selecting a category for me, was compelling.”). 
Agreement with all statements was indicated on a seven-point rating scale (1 =“not at all”; 7=“most 
definitely”). For all items, see part 2 of the SM. 
 Lastly, we presented the participants with several multiple-choice questions designed to 
capture the extent, to which they had paid attention to the stimulus information. A full list of the 






employed by Paunov et al., (2018), only participants who had answered all control questions 
correctly were included in the analysis.  
Results and Discussion 
 Forty-six participants were excluded for providing wrong answers to one or more items of 
the stimulus attention check, leaving a sample of N=265 valid cases. Running all following analyses 
with all participants included yields the same conclusions. The main descriptive results are reported 
in Table 2. Across the transparent conditions, an average of 76.3 % of the participants chose to stay 
with the default (vs. 23.7% who opted out), while in the conventional default condition, only 49.1% 
chose this option, but 50.9% opted out. For comparison, the crucial option was selected by only 
22.2 % of the respondents in the free-choice condition. 
 For a test of significance, choices (coded 1 = stay/choose target option; 0 = opt out/choose 
other option) were predicted from two Helmert contrasts in a binomial logistic regression. The 
contrasts indicated whether there was a default or not (free choice = – 0.50, transparent default 
conditions and conventional default condition = 0.125), and whether the default was transparent or 
not (transparent defaults = 0.167, free choice = 0, conventional default = – 0.50). A summary of 
the regression is available in Table 3. 
 
Table 2 
 Proportion of participants choosing the target option per condition. 
Condition 





      disclosure 
Default & 
general        
effect disclosure 
Conventional      
default 
  Free choice 
Choice of 
target option 
83.6% (46/55)   85.4% (41/48)    60.4% (32/53) 49.1% (27/55) 
22.2% 
(12/54) 
Note: Participants' choice of the target option versus choice of another option ratios are in parentheses. 









 The first contrast was significant, b = 3.39 (SE = 0.58), Wald-χ2(1) =34.12, p < .001, 
showing that the default systematically increased choices of the target option over a free-choice 
format. Pertinent to our research question, transparency significantly increased the proportion of 
participants choosing the defaulted option as compared to the conventional default condition: b = 
1.81 (SE = 0.49), Wald-χ2(1) = 13.41, p <  .001. Therefore, even in cases when the desired behavior 
comes with the possibility of a personal loss, making a default explicitly transparent increased its 
effectiveness. Notably, the respective choice option was not favored a priori, as evident from the 
free choice condition. The default setting doubled the choices for that option, and making the 
default explicitly transparent more than tripled it3.  
 
3 In addition to the analysis on binary compliance decisions, we also ran an ordinary least squared regression with 
time spent as the criterion variable. For this purpose, the time categories were transformed to a continuous time scale 
(< 3 minutes” = 2, “3 to 5 minutes” = 4; “5 to 7 minutes” = 6; “7 to 9 minutes” = 8; and “more than 9 minutes” = 10), 
and regressed on the two Helmert contrasts. Besides the significant intercept, b = 5.00, SE = .11, t = 44.52, p < .001, 
the first coefficient was significant, b = 2.07, SE = .45, t = 4.64, p < .001, indicating that people in the default 
condition were willing to spend more time on research than people in the free-choice condition. The second 
coefficient, b = .92, SE = .43, t = 2.13, p = .034, was significant, too. Thus, participants accepted to spent more time 
when the default was made transparent than when it was not. Further pairwise comparisons revealed that disclosing 
the default’s general effect, M = 4.75, SD = 1.93, yielded similar donations as the mere default, M = 4.80, SD = 2.09, 
t(106) = .12, p = .91. However, clarifying the target behavior, M = 5.56, SD = 1.42), t(108) = 2.24, p = .027, and 
disclosing the default’s purpose, M = 5.95, SD = 1.27), t(101) = 3.33, p = .001, both significantly increased the 
amount of time spent on research as compared to the mere-default condition. Overall, the findings from the 
continuous regression model complement the main analysis, showing that transparency does not only increase 
default compliance, but also increases donation quantity. However, this interpretation has to be met with certain 
Table 3 
Summary of logistic regression analysis for the effects of default and transparency on choice of 
target option.  
Predictor B S.E. Wald Df Exp(B) 
Default  3.391** 0.58 34.128 1 29,696 
Transparency                1.806** 0.493 13.413 1 6.086 
Constant               0.443 0.141 9.827 1 1.557 
Note: The predictors are Helmert contrasts. Default compares participants from the free choice condition versus 
participants from the default conditions. Transparency compares participants from the transparent default conditions 
against the conventional default condition.  
**p< .001. 






 Next, in an exploratory manner, we compared the effect of each transparency component 
against the conventional default condition. When faced with a mere default, 49.1% of the 
participants stayed with the pre-selected option. As illustrated in Figure 1, compliance rates were 
higher in the general effect disclosure condition (60,4%, Х²(1, N = 108) = 1.39, p = .239), the target 
behavior disclosure condition (83.6%, Х²(1, N = 110) = 14.70, p < .001), and the default purpose 
disclosure condition (85.4%, Х²(1, N = 103) = 15.07, p < .001), but only the latter two conditions 
were significantly different from the conventional default group. Therefore, disclosing the way in 
which defaults affect behavior in general was not detrimental to default effectiveness as could be 
assumed based on self-determination and reactance theories. Yet, it had no significant positive 
effect either. In congruence with our predictions, disclosing the purpose of the default or the 
expected target behavior was sufficient to bring about a positive effect on default effectiveness.  
Figure 1. Participant choice of target option per condition 
 
 
caution, since the transformation of a categorical dependent measure to a continuous one assumes equidistance of the 











































 Next, we assessed whether compliance behavior was related to participants’ perceptions of 
endorser deceptiveness. While higher perceived deceptiveness was negatively correlated with 
choosing the default option (r = -.144, n = 265, p =.019), the deceptiveness scores did not differ 
significantly between conditions (F(4, 260) = .917, p = .455), suggesting that perceived 
deceptiveness was not responsible for the transparency effect.  
Moreover, across the transparency conditions we assessed the strength of the argument for 
setting up the default. Perceived argument strength was positively correlated with compliance         
(r = .208, n = 180, p = .005) so that stronger arguments were associated with higher compliance 
rates. Participant scores were highest in the default purpose condition (M = 5.14, SD = 1.18), 
followed by the general effect (M = 4.69, SD = .94) and goal behavior (M = 4.07, SD = 1.5) 
disclosure conditions (F(2, 153) = 10.582, p = .001). In sum, people’s compliance to a transparent 
default nudge was positively related to the strength of the arguments provided for setting up the 
intervention, and disclosing the defaults’ purpose was considered the strongest argument. 
 
General discussion 
 The results confirmed that introducing transparency to a conventional default nudge can 
increase its effectiveness. Replicating the findings of Paunov et al. (2018) not only substantiates a 
previously isolated finding in the literature, but also supports a proactive approach to transparency 
in nudging, re-affirming that (within limitations) a transparent nudge can be more effective than a 
conventional one. After all, transparency is one of the guiding principles of the nudging paradigm 
(Thaler & Sunstein, 2008), enabling people to scrutinize the implemented forms of choice 






 In addition, we demonstrated that that the role of transparency in defaults is more complex 
than expected from previous (null) findings (Loewenstein et al.,2015; Steffel et al.,2016). Going 
beyond the data available so far, we demonstrated which transparency disclosures can bring about 
the effect. In line with our predictions, disclosing the purpose of the default had a positive effect 
on compliance. This finding is in line with previous research on request justification (Langer, 
1978), and provides a possible link to the persuasiveness of the disclosure, which was judged to 
contain the strongest argument in favor of the pre-selection.  
 We also showed that disclosing which target behavior is desired increased compliance in 
comparison to a classic default nudge. While previous research links the provision of exact 
behavioral information to increased theoretical support for similar nudges (Felsen et al., 2013), as 
to our knowledge, our findings are the first to relate the disclosure of target behavior to an increase 
in actual compliance with defaults. 
  Further, informing the participants of the defaults’ general effect was neither detrimental, 
nor beneficial for compliance. Possibly, two effects cancelled each other out, resulting in a null-
effect: while on the one hand participants in this condition perceived the endorser as relatively fair, 
they rated the argument strength of the disclosure as lowest from all conditions. A similar 
combination of positive and negative effects of transparency may help explaining why previous 
research on transparent defaults (Steffel et al., 2016; Bruns et al., 2018) did not find an increase in 
compliance, or in manifestations of psychological reactance upon disclosure.  
 Our results also lend support to the generalizability and robustness of the effect. First, we 
demonstrated that the positive impact of transparency persists even in cases, when the pre-selected 
option implies a possible personal loss (namely spending more time working than one is paid for). 






services of a commercial panel. Research shows that the majority of panel workers are motivated 
by money (Paolacci, Chandler, & Ipeirotis, 2010), and the quantity of their participation is usually 
a function of payment (Litman et al., 2015). Nevertheless, the participants in our experiment chose 
to stay with the default at their own expense, especially so when the default’s purpose or target 
behavior was disclosed.   
 While our findings advocate transparency as a tool to increase default effectiveness, there 
are several limitations to their generalizability. First, a disclosure of the default’s purpose may not 
always benefit default participation. For instance, if the default purpose is perceived to be at odds 
with strong behavioral guides, such as social norms or moral mandates (Seiler, 2015), its disclosure 
can fail to produce the desired effect. 
 Second, if the purpose of a given default is interpreted as serving the default-setters´ vested 
self-interests instead of being benevolent (Steffel, Williams, and Pogacar, 2016), no positive effects 
are expected.  
 Likewise, transparency may not increase compliance if the default contribution comes with 
inacceptable costs. As Bruns et al. (2018) demonstrated, default effects on donation rates did not 
benefit from transparency, when the contribution was set to a very costly option. It seems that 
transparency affects the willingness to comply, but only within a given acceptance threshold. 
Whether that is indeed the case, remains an open empirical question. 
 Another possible direction for future research is related to the mechanisms behind the 
individual disclosure contributions to compliance. Here, we provided some preliminary insight 
regarding the roles of endorser deceptiveness and disclosure argument strength. However, since 






correlational. Therefore, further and more systematic investigation is pending, where, for instance, 
the variables are manipulated experimentally.    
Conclusion 
 The present research re-affirms the positive effect of transparency on the effectiveness of 
default nudges. Our findings also provide an insight as to which transparency components are 
worth disclosing in a default setting. Importantly, we show that an ethical and theory-driven 
interpretation of the classic default nudge can increase compliance even in cases, where the desired 
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1.  General instructions (all conditions). In the free-choice condition, none of the choice options 
was pre-selected. Across the default conditions, category C (5-7) min. was defaulted, as shown 
in the example below. In the transparent default conditions, the same category was pre-
selected, and a transparency disclosure was provided. The full text of the transparency 


























2. Full list of items in the perceived endorser deceptiveness and perceived argument strength 
measures. All statements within the respective measure were presented in a random order. 
Agreement with all statements was indicated on a seven-point rating scale (1 =“not at all”; 
7=“most definitely”)  
 
2.1   Perceived endorser deceptiveness  
 
When I consider how the choice of categories was presented to me, I think that the 
experimenters... 
 
...were open with me. 
...were trying to mislead me. 
...approached me in a sincere way. 
...were honest with me. 
...tried to manipulate me. 
...tried to trick me. 
 
2.2  Perceived argument strength 
 






...was logically sound. 
...gave me a good reason to choose the preselected option. 
 
 
3. Full list of attention check items per condition (* marks the correct answer).  
In all conditions: 
 On the page, where you had to choose a study category... 
...*one of the categories was already preselected1. 
...the categories were ordered by the topic of the studies they contain. 
...none of these options is correct. 
...I don’t know. 
1 This answer was correct in all default conditions, and incorrect in the free choice condition.  






Default & purpose disclosure condition 
On the page where you had to choose a study category, one of the categories was already 
preselected. We preselected category C (5-7 min.) for you, because... 
...*with the choice of this category you guarantee, that we will accomplish our research 
objectives. 
...the choice of this category would increase your payment. 
...this category contained the most exciting studies. 
...I don’t know. 
Default & target behavior disclosure condition  
On the page where you had to choose a study category, one of the categories was already 
preselected. We preselected category C (5-7 min.) for you, because.....the choice of this category 
would increase your payment. 
...this category contained the most exciting studies. 
...*we wanted you to choose this category. 
...I don’t know. 
 
Default & general effect disclosure condition 
On the page where you had to choose a study category, one of the categories was already 
preselected. We preselected category C (5-7 min.) for you, because... 
 
...the choice of this category would increase your payment. 
...*we know that in decision situations, people often stick with a choice option which is pre-
selected for them. 
...this category contained the most exciting studies. 













 Paunov, Y., Wänke, M., & Vogel, T. (in press). Combining defaults and transparency 



























 Combining the strengths of defaults and transparency information is a potentially powerful 
way to induce policy compliance. Despite negative theoretical predictions, a recent line of research 
revealed that default nudges may become more effective if people are informed why they should 
exhibit the targeted behavior. Yet, it is an open empirical question whether the increase in 
compliance came from setting a default and consequently disclosing it, or the provided information 
was sufficient to deliver the effect on its own. Results from an online experiment indicate that both 
defaulting and transparency information exert a statistically independent effect on compliance, 
with highest compliance rates observed in the combined condition. Practical and theoretical 
















 One of the corner stones of social organization is the shared belief that its very purpose is 
to ensure the well-being of society’s members. This purpose is achieved through peoples’ ability 
to exhibit prosocial behavior, i.e. to act in a way that benefits others (Hinde & Groebel, 1991), 
often at a cost to the individual (Irwin, 2009). However, people are also innately motivated to 
maximize their own utility (De Cremer, Seelenberg & Murningham, 2013). Therefore, the 
traditional approaches to promoting pro-social behavior seek to either incentivize it, or to penalize 
free-riding (Capraro, Jagfeld, Klein, Mul, & van de Pol, 2019). Consequently, such approaches can 
be either costly, or too restrictive. 
  As an alternative, Thaler and Sunstein (2008) introduced a set of behavioral interventions, 
or “nudges”, as a cheap and less paternalistic way of promoting various pro-social and pro-self 
behaviors. They defined nudging as “…any aspect of the choice architecture, that alters people’s 
choices in a predictable way without forbidding any options or significantly changing their 
economic incentives” (Thaler & Sunstein, 2008, p. 6). In their simplest form, nudges engineer the 
choice environment so that choosing the desired option becomes easier. This is primarily done by 
targeting effortless and intuitive thought processes (Thaler & Sunstein, 2008; Kahneman, 2011), 
which do not involve reflection (Hansen & Jespersen, 2013). To illustrate, a set of human eyes next 
to charity boxes increases donations by creating a sensation of being observed (Kelsey, Vaish, & 
Grossmann, 2018), and video primes of pristine nature increase pro-environmental attitudes 
(Bimonte et al, 2019). 
 However, nudges can also involve more deliberate, reflective thought processes (Thaler & 
Sunstein, 2008; Hansen & Jespersen, 2013). These interventions manipulate the information 
coupled with the desired choice option, and arguably require more processing effort to work 






energy use reduces energy consumption (Allcott, 2011), and asking people to imagine “the right 
thing to do” increases charity donations to humanitarian organizations (Capraro et al., 2019). 
  Perhaps the most effective nudging technique is the use of defaults. Default nudges 
establish a setup, in which certain decision options are pre-selected, and come into effect if people 
do not take active steps to change them (Sunstein & Reisch, 2014). Arguably, defaults share 
characteristics of both nudging approaches: Some researchers state that defaults work because of 
automatic processes such as the status quo bias (Samuelson & Zeckhauser, 1988) and loss aversion 
(Tversky & Kahneman, 1991), while others claim that people comply because they reflect and infer 
that the pre-selected option is the recommended one (McKenzie, Liersch & Finkelstein, 2006). In 
any case, default nudges are effective in inducing compliance to pro-social policies, with prominent 
examples involving organ donation (Johnson & Goldstein, 2003) and retirement savings (Thaler & 
Benartzi, 2004).  
 However, researchers have argued that defaults restrict people’s autonomy and ability to 
exercise informed choice (Smith, Goldstein & Johnson, 2013), since the targeted individuals are 
largely unaware of the goal of the intervention (Hansen & Jespersen, 2013). Consequently, a call 
for transparency when implementing default nudges emerged (Sunstein, 2015).  
 Yet there is concern that providing information about defaults would diminish their effect 
on compliance, and could even have adverse effects. Bovens (2009) theorized that once people 
receive information about a given nudge, they can react with behaviors that are inconsistent with 
the goal of the intervention. Reactance theory (Brehm, 1966) and the self-determination approach 
(Deci, 1975; Ryan & Deci, 2000) would even assume that the mere presence of an influence attempt 






 The empirical evidence on the matter is limited, but so far the available literature reports 
no negative impact of combining transparency and defaults (Loewenstein et al., 2015; Steffel et 
al., 2016; Bruns et al., 2018). Instead, a recent line of research by Paunov, Wänke, & Vogel (2019a; 
2019b) demonstrated that providing transparency information about a default was not only not 
detrimental, but even increased the effectiveness of the influence attempt. Across a number of 
studies, the authors asked their respondents to decide how much time they wanted to spend on 
participating in an experiment. Telling them that one option was preselected because choosing this 
option would be best for the researchers (informed default) almost tripled compliance in 
comparison to a conventional default intervention. This substantial boost was explained by 
adopting a socio-psychological perspective, which treats defaults as a form of social 
communication between default-setter and recipient. As suggested by McKenzie and colleagues 
(2006), the targets of a default intervention are likely to infer that the pre-selected option is 
implicitly recommended by the default setter. In this vein, Paunov et al. (2019a) reasoned that a 
providing information about the default may boost its impact by transforming the implicit 
recommendation into an explicit one. Moreover, laying open one´s intentions also signals that one 
is sincere and is to be trusted. 
 However, a closer look at the evidence reveals that the sizable effect of the informed default 
nudge might require further investigation. In particular, it remains unclear whether the high 
compliance increase in the informed default condition was due to the combined influence of both 
information and defaulting, or because of the information alone. Since the information provided 
for the default should work similarly to a persuasive argument, both propositions are possible. On 
the one hand, it has been shown that in a given decision situation, the effects from two information 






influence on the decision’s outcome. Thus, both the implicit recommendation from the default and 
the information about its purpose may contribute to the effectiveness of the influence attempt. 
Accordingly, the decision cues (defaulted option and information) could exert two independent 
main effects on compliance. 
On the other hand, it is known that more diagnostic information can attenuate the effect of 
the less diagnostic cues on choice (attenuation hypothesis, Chaiken & Maheswaran, 1994). 
Pertinent to this perspective, the default in a combined nudge may be seen as relatively 
uninformative, and can even become obsolete when compared to the informational value of the 
provided information (Keller, Harlam, Lowenstein, & Volpp, 2011). In that case, one should be 
able to achieve a substantial compliance boost by simply informing the participants which option 
is most desirable, even when no default is set.  
 In sum, it appears that a clean test of the effectiveness of informed defaulting is still 
pending. To address the issue, the present research adds a condition in which no default is set, but 
the same information as in the informed default condition is provided. This allows to disentangle 
the effect of the information from the combined effect of informed defaulting. 
The present research 
 An online experiment was conducted, which explored the effects of providing information 
and defaulting in the context of devoting time to scientific research. Compliance rates across four 
experimental conditions were compared between participants. The setup was largely similar to the 
one, used by Paunov and colleagues (2019b), except for the introduction of a separate information 
provision condition (for a detailed description of the stimulus material and experimental procedure, 






same direction, we predicted positive main effects of defaulting (H1) and information (H2) on 
compliance, in accordance with the additivity hypothesis (Bohner et al., 1995; Chaiken & 
Maheswaran, 1994). As a consequence, we predicted that the combination of defaulting and 
information will yield the highest compliance across conditions.  
Method 
Participants and design 
 The required sample size for a planned power of 1-ß = 0.8 (two-tailed, α= .05), was 
calculated with G*Power (Faul, Erdfelder, Buchner, & Lang, 2009) using odds ratios (ORs). The 
expected effect sizes were extrapolated from previous research on informed defaults (Paunov et 
al., 2019a; 2019b). An odds ratio of 2.132 and a probability of opting out under information 
provision Pr(Y = 1 |X = 1) H0 = .46 rendered a required sample of 228 participants. Two hundred 
and fifty-six (256) English-speaking participants were recruited via an online respondent panel 
(163 females (63.7%), 93 males (36.3%), mean age 37.4 years, (SD=12)), and were randomly 
assigned to four experimental conditions in a 2(default: present/absent) X 2 (Information: 
provided/not provided) between-participants design. Each respondent was paid £ 0.45 for taking 
part in the study. 
Materials and procedure 
 Respondents who decided to take part in our research were informed that there were several 
studies from which they could choose, and that the offered studies differed in content and duration. 
Only the duration was provided for each study without any content description to avoid unrelated 
topic preferences. The following five choice options were listed: “< 3 minutes”, “3 to 5 minutes”; 
“5 to 7 minutes”; “7 to 9 minutes”; and “more than 9 minutes”. Across all conditions and 






would be paid for doing a 5 minute study, independent of the duration of the study they chose. 
Therefore, choosing the “< 3 minutes” represented the opportunity to spend less than 5 minutes 
(thus maximizing the respondents’ profit), while the second allowed for spending a maximum of 5 
minutes in order to break even without violating the contract. Across two default conditions, the 
“5 to 7 minutes” option was pre-selected. A choice of this option meant that the participants 
accepted personal costs for the sake of supporting scientific research, a representation of pro-social 
behavior. In the conventional default condition, the “5 to 7 minutes” option was pre-selected, 
unaccompanied by information. In the informed default condition, the pre-selection was 
accompanied by a disclosure, which clarified the consequences of sticking with the default: “Please 
note the following: with choosing Category C (5-7 min), you guarantee that we will be able to 
accomplish our research objectives”. The same information was presented in an information 
provision condition, where none of the choice options was pre-selected. A forth, free choice 
condition obtained a baseline. Upon making their choice and providing some demographic 
information, the participants were redirected to an unrelated task, which took approximately 5 
minutes to complete. Finally, all respondents were thoroughly debriefed about the purpose of the 
experiment, re-affirmed their agreement to submit data, and received a code to redeem their 
payment.  
Results and Discussion 
 The main descriptive results per cell are reported in Table 1. Specifically, compliance was 
lowest in the free choice condition, where only 16.9% of the respondents chose the target option. 
Participant compliance was higher when a default was set but no information was given (64.1%), 
and when no default was set but information was provided (68.3%). Pertinent to our research 






information treatments (91%). There, the participants chose the target option significantly more 
than those in the information provision condition (Х²(1, N = 127) = 10.37, p = .001) and the 
conventional default condition (Х²(1, N = 131) = 13.82, p < .001).   
 To test the pattern, the main dependent measure (coded 1 for stay/choose target option, and 
0 for opt out out/choose a different option) was predicted from two effect-coded contrasts in a 
binomial logistic regression. The contrasts indicated whether there was a default or not (default 
conditions = 1, free choice conditions = -1), and whether information was provided or not 
(information conditions= 1, no information conditions = -1). Table 2 provides a summary of the 
results. The first contrast was significant, b = 1.025 (SE = 1.65), Wald-χ2(1) =38.45, p < .001, 
indicating that the default increased compliance, in accordance with our first hypothesis. In 
congruence with our second prediction, the second contrast was also highly significant, b = .930 
(SE = 1.65), Wald-χ2(1) =31.625, p < .001, showing that the provision of information increased 
choices for the target option. The effects from both treatments appeared statistically independent 
from one another, as indicated by the non-significant interaction term, b = -.155 (SE = 1.65), Wald-
χ2(1) =.877, p = .349. Therefore, at least on the statistical level, the effectiveness of informed 
defaults seems to reflect the additivity of both factors.  
 
Table 1 
 Percentage of participants choosing the target option as a function of a 2(default: 
present/absent) X 2(information provided/not provided) between participants design. 
  Default  
Information Present Absent Total 
Provided 91% (61/67) 68.3% (41/60) 80.3% (102/127) 
Not provided 64.1% (41/64) 16.9% (11/65) 40.3% (52/129) 
Total 77.8% (102/131) 40.8% (52/125)   








Table 2  
Summary of logistic regression analysis for the effects of default and information provision 
on choice of target option. 
Predictor B S.E. Wald Df OR 95% CI 
Default  1.025** 0.165 38.457 1 2.788 [2.01, 3.85] 
Information  .930** 0.165 31.625 1 2.534 [1.83, 3.50] 
Default x Information -.155 0.165 0.877 1 0.857 [0.62, 1.18] 
Constant 0.519* 0.165 9.846 1 1.68   
Note: OR = odds ratio; CI = confidence interval; the predictors are effect coded variables. Default compares 
participants from the free choice conditions versus participants from the default conditions. Information 
compares participants from the informed conditions against the uninformed conditions. Default x Information 
represents the interaction term. 






 The results confirmed that a combination of defaulting and informing about the default can 
be a powerful tool for inducing compliance. Our findings contribute to the current state of nudging 
research in several ways: First, they demonstrate that the positive impact of informed defaults 
persists in cases, when choosing the pre-selected option implies a tradeoff between personal gain 
and a pro-social goal. Therefore, it appears that informed defaulting is applicable to the most 
common default settings, where such a tradeoff is present - to policies aimed at increasing 
charitable donations (Fiala & Noussair, 2017) or contributing to environmental protection (Pichert 
& Katsikopoulos, 2008).  
 Beyond previous data, we showed that the informed default nudge does not owe its 
effectiveness to the mere presence of transparency information. Instead, we find evidence that both 
defaulting and the information contribute to the sizable increase in compliance, in a rather additive 
fashion. In this sense, the results help dissuade previous concerns that combining both approaches 
can have an adverse effect on compliance (Bovens, 2009). With that, we hope that our findings 






 While the results advocate the combination of defaulting and information provision as an 
effective way of increasing compliance, there are several limitations to their generalizability. 
 First, we limit our predictions to settings, where choosing the default benefits others. 
Defaults aimed at self-beneficial behaviors (such as healthy eating or exercising, for instance) 
should gain less from information about the consequences of complying. That is because people 
would presumably know this information already (Payne1, Jones, & Harris, 2004), and 
highlighting it is less likely to trigger a substantial increase in compliance. 
 Second, despite the evidence that the effects of defaulting and informing are statistically 
independent, it does not follow that the processes in all groups are the same: for instance, 
participants in the combined group could still make sense of the joint presence of both in their own 
way (e.g. considering that the defaulter is more sincere when information is present). Future 
research needs to conduct further and more systematic investigation of the mechanisms behind the 
effects in all conditions. For instance, by assessing whether the experimental conditions affect 
people’s inferences regarding the appropriateness of the target behavior, on the one hand, and their 
perceptions of the policy maker on the other (Paunov et al., 2019a).   
Conclusion 
 The present research demonstrates that the positive effect of transparent defaults stems from 
both defaulting and explaining the default. Importantly, we present initial proof for the building 
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